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SOCIAL DESIGN AND SUSTAINABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES:
LEARNING FROM THE FIELD EXPERIMENTS.
ABSTRACT
Sustainability has become a key issue in managing natural resources together with grow-
ing concern for capitalism, environment and resource problems. The paradigms of the
economy, society, and natural environment are going through fundamental changes and
human society is in the midst of great transition. The major agents of this transition
could be from a market and institution like democracy. Therefore, one of the solutions
for natural resource management could be through economic-incentive, in other words,
market-based policy instrument. Market-based instruments, such as tradable permits are
considered to capture feature of free-market environmentalism if they are well designed
and implemented. A marketable permits system (MPS) has been deemed effective in
laboratory experiments, however, little is known about how the MPS works in the field.
As a first step, we evaluate the MPS efficiency of forest conservation by conducting
framed field experiments in Nepal. Forestland demands are elicited from farmers, with
which the experiments are carried out. The novelty lies in instituting a uniform price
auction (UPA) under trader settings and in identifying the MPS efficiency for forest
conservation in the field of developing nations. The results suggest that farmers with
limited education understand UPA rules, reveal their forestland valuations and that the
MPS is effective with 80% of efficiency. However, there are certain limitations with the
free market as it creates externalities.
Second, the market is better when no waste is created, but, it is not the case with
current capitalism that is ongoing in the societies. It appears to be an important issue
to find out externalities produced by the market and how market competition shapes
peoples’ behavior and preference. Many literature in the past have shown that economic
environment and institutions affect people behavior and preferences. Therefore, we want
to see how current ongoing modernization of competitive societies, which we refer to as
“capitalism,” might affect human nature to utilize natural resources that are provided in
commons.
To test our hypothesis, we design and implement a set of dynamic common pool
resource games and experiments in the following two types of Nepalese areas: (i) rural
(non-capitalistic) and (ii) urban (capitalistic) areas. We find that a proportion of proso-
cial individuals in urban areas are lower than that in rural areas, and urban residents
deplete resources more quickly than rural residents. The composition of proself and
prosocial individuals in a group and the degree of capitalism are crucial in that an in-
crease in prosocial members in a group and the rural dummy positively affect resource
sustainability by 65% and 63%, respectively. Overall, this paper shows that for some
class of social problems market yields better performance, while on the other hand,
when societies move toward more capitalistic environments, the sustainability of com-
mon pool resources tends to decrease with the changes in individual preferences, social
norms, customs and views to others through human interactions.
Third, to further analyze peoples’ real behavior we again conduct field experiments
of the social value orientation and the generative behavior checklist in the two fields of
Nepalese societies: (1) urban and (2) rural areas. Generativity as concern, and commit-
ment to the next generation, is one important factor for sustainable development of a
society. Generativity emerges through both prosocial and proself behaviors character-
ized by social preference, and is now hypothesized to decrease in some modern societies
called “generativity crisis.” However, little is known about how ongoing modernization
of competitive societies, i.e., capitalism, and social preferences affect generativity. The
analysis finds that prosociality and the rural-specific effect are the two major factors that
positively affect people’s generativity, while a larger proportion of prosocial people are
found in rural areas than in urban areas
Finally, our results imply that individuals may be losing their coordination abilities
while facing social dilemmas, therefore social design is necessary to ensure sustainabil-
ity of human society. We are in need of new social institution or design that can govern
and guide us to cooperate and coordinate.
Key Words: common pool resources, marketable permits system, field experiments,
forest management, social dilemma, sustainability
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Market based instrument have been considered by many resource economists over
the past decades because they believe that it encourages behaviour through market sig-
naling rather than through directive methods (Field and Conrad, 1975). Some com-
munities have been successful to manage environmental resources while other fails,
these phenomena deserves our attention. Common pool resource management has been
playing a great role in solving many issues such as disaster mitigation and sustaining
livelihood through providing employment and other supports. Concurrently with solv-
ing issues, CPRs also have deeper relationship between group dynamics, communities
collective stake for resources, social norms, and enforcement mechanism.
With the process of industrialization and urbanization traditional resources manage-
ment system has been gradually declining and it is breaking humans ties with natural
resources and ecosystem, that has challenged us to search for new theoretical frame-
work and institutional design. There are many other factors that could be responsible
for these shift such as external regulation, change in rights and obligation, population
growth, change in economy and foreign aids. The disintegration of the collective stake
as well as unfair welfare distribution process might have been responsible for discontin-
uation of various process and practice of CPRs.
There are two distinct issues associated with human or nature provided CPRs such
as irrigation system, groundwater basins or fisheries, i.e., appropriation and provision
problems. These both problems account for demand and supply side of common pool re-
sources. The problem of appropriation starts with the efficiently managing externalities
and technological issues. Secondly, provision problems begin with behavioral incen-
1
2tives and individual social preference for managing appropriation activities within exist-
ing CPRs. Given these circumstances, natural resource management requires research
to focus on a local context to develop and understand new social institution. Therefore,
in these three essays, my focus is on the reorientation of the market-based mechanism
such as MPS in rural Nepal for the management of community-based forestry. Next, we
are trying to understand the existing difference in societies for an appropriation of CPRs
with ongoing capitalism in the society. With the similar interest, while contemporary
urban societies are losing skills and capabilities to properly appropriate CPRs we are
also interested to know the intergenerational linkage in two different societies.
1.1 Overview of voluntary forestry management system:
Community forestry is a voluntary forestry management system in which the CFUG
members contribute labor to organize some collective activities of forest protection and
management, such as meeting, harvesting, weeding, thinning, pruning and guarding. In
return, they are allowed to harvest non-timber products. Harvesting non-timber products
is highly labor-intensive. Poor households do not usually possess land and cattle (Ad-
hikari et al., 2004). Thus, firewood is the only non-timber product they are motivated to
harvest. Unfortunately, however, it is reported that such poor households cannot suffi-
ciently allocate their own labor for harvesting firewood because they are swamped with
daily agricultural labor works and do not have enough money to hire additional exter-
nal labor (Adhikari et al., 2007). Relatively high-income or middle-income households
within the CFUG usually possess land and cattle so that they are motivated to harvest
a variety of non-timber products such as leaf litter, fodder and thatching materials (Ad-
hikari et al., 2007). Since they are not struggling with their daily life compared to poor
households, they can allocate their own time to harvest such non-timber products or can
3even hire additional external labor. Therefore, poor households do not utilize the oppor-
tunities of CFUG, while middle-income or high-income households utilize them more
efficiently (Adhikari et al., 2004, 2007).
In summary, community forestry management as a participatory system had been
considered a viable solution to forestland preservation. However, it have resulted in un-
desirable outcomes for poor households due to the aforementioned problems. Previous
literature has supported this finding, and the community forestry management system
is claimed to be inefficient in its process because poor households are deprived of the
appropriation of resources and the benefits of sharing (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001; Ad-
hikari et al., 2004, 2007). Consequently, this system has not necessarily helped poor
people in Nepal, but has often worked to their disadvantage (Graner, 1997; Adhikari
et al., 2007). Gautam (1987) argues that the indigenous forest management is more eq-
uitable and effective in conserving nature’s integrity than community forestry because
the latter fails to achieve an equitable cost-benefit sharing arrangement for society. The
consequences of such a failure have led to inefficiencies and have opened the door to the
inceptions of feasible and alternative institutional setups for new forest management to
enhance the access of poorer households to the forest.
The MPS could be a solution when applied to forestland management, as it gives a
right to the people to utilize forest products without clear-cutting timbers. This approach
can provide equal rights to all individuals, and by holding the permits, each individual
can commercially utilize forestland under some controlled regulations. To implement
the MPS, local farmers are required to enter into a time contract to attain an arranged
number of permits for forestland use, in which they can carry out agro-forestry farm-
ing. Initial permits can be allocated equally without socio-economic discrimination and,
thus, the MPS can address inequitable distributions of resources through the allocation
4of initial rights.
1.2 Global debate on sustainability:
One of the most important issues faced today is to what extent the interest of fu-
ture generation’s needs are to be addressed, while a sustainable society have to sat-
isfy current generation’s needs without jeopardizing the prospect of future generations
(Howard, 2000; Masini, 2013; Tonn, 2009, 2017). The sustainability of natural re-
sources is claimed to be endangered worldwide, as many countries are now moving
toward more competitive environments. Therefore, it is important to analyze how socio-
ecological environments are established to affect human nature with respect to ongoing
modernization of competitive environments, i.e., “capitalism,” . Despite the ongoing
global debate, no works have addressed these issues. In the second essay of the thesis,
we focus on discussion how the degree of capitalism in societies characterizes individual
prosociality, behaviors and CPR sustainability.
To this end, we design and implement a set of dynamic CPR games and experiments
in the two types of Nepalese areas, urban (capitalistic) and rural (non-capitalistic) areas.
Nepalese areas are studied, because Nepal is characterized by relatively uniform ethnic,
religious and cultural demographics, but has wide disparities between rural and urban
areas with respect to daily life practices. The features of Nepal allow us to control for
degrees of capitalism in our field experiments without experiencing confounding factors.
51.3 Concern and commitment towards current and next genera-
tions:
One important element for sustainable development of a society depends upon con-
cern and commitment that members of society have for the current and next generations,
Erikson (1963) defined it as generativity . Higher generativity of the current generation
induces people to educate and benefit the next generation and even the next (Erikson,
1963; Volckmann, 2014). Generations overlap in societies as it transit over time in a
way that some members in one generation survive and remain as members in the next
generations (Gaspar and Lauren, 2013). Unfortunately, the current generation has be-
haved in more selfish ways than ever, compromising generativity and intergenerational
sustainability by incurring costs for the current and next generation, i.e., “generativity
crisis” (Sasaki, 2004; Fisher et al., 2004; Milinski et al., 2006; Pratt et al., 2013; Molnar
and Vass, 2013; Jia et al., 2015; Lefebvre and Lefebvre, 2016). Therefore, the third es-
say in this thesis features future generations thinking or generativity. When societies are
changing in favor of the current generations it becomes an urgent issue and addressing
the generativity in relation to intergenerational sustainability deserves higher attention.
Chapter 2
Evaluating the potential of marketable permits
in a framed field experiment: Forest
conservation in Nepal
2.1 Introduction
Economists have long considered a marketable permits system (MPS) to be poten-
tially effective for preservation of environments and natural resources due to the decen-
tralized nature and the price signals of market exchanges (Shogren, 2005).1 The most
important advantage economists claim for the MPS is that it can achieve environmental
objectives with the least cost to the society, i.e., efficiency (Field and Field, 2006). Given
this positive view of the MPS, extensive studies have been conducted to test theories and
examine the performance (Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore, 1994). However, little is still
known about how the MPS achieves the efficiencies in the real-world conditions of the
field, especially in the context of managing the natural resources of developing nations.
Therefore, this research addresses the efficiency of the MPS and to provide an important
test for its proposed institution in a framed field experiment.2
Many studies on MPS experiments have been conducted to verify the performance
in controlled laboratory settings with various environments and treatments. There are
two important dimensions of the experimental designs: (i) the market institution for
1In this paper, the MPS is interchangeably referred to as “tradable property rights”
or “transferable development rights.”
2We categorize our experiment as a “framed field experiment” following Harrison
and List (2004) and List (2011).
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7permit trading, either a double auction (DA) or a uniform price auction (UPA), and (ii)
the trader or non-trader settings. The first dimension is concerned with the organization
of the price determination mechanism in the permit market. The DA mechanism is a
real-time trading institution where agents can submit bids to buy and offers to sell for
permits or can accept the best bid and offer made by other agents at any time during
trading periods of several minutes.3 Therefore, the DA gives more flexibility to agents
in terms of trading strategy.
In comparison, the UPA is simpler because all of the permit trades are made with a
uniform price.4 First, each agent is asked to submit his or her “bids to buy,” representing
the price she is willing to pay for each unit of additional permits, as well as “offers to
sell,” representing the price with which she is willing to sell each unit of permits she has.
After all the agents submit bids to buy and offers to sell, a central authority collects and
ranks all of the bids to buy from high to low (the demand curve), all of the offers to sell
from low to high (the supply curve) and determines the intersection of the demand and
supply curves. Specifically, the intersection occurs at the last unit in which the bid to
buy exceeds the offer to sell, and the uniform price is the average between the two. The
UPA has also been established to achieve high efficiencies and stable price dynamics
(Smith et al., 1982; Cason and Plott, 1996).
The second dimension is concerned with whether each agent in a permit market
can be both a seller and a buyer or each agent can be only one of these during trading
periods. If he (she) can be both, we call the environment a “trader setting,” and if he
(she) cannot, the environment is a “non-trader setting” (Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore,
1994). Regarding application of the MPS, the trader setting is known to be closer to
3Refer to Davis and Holt (1992) for the details of the DAs.
4A UPA is also known as a call market. See Davis and Holt (1992) for further
reference.
8real-world conditions. However, a considerable portion of experimental works employ
non-trader settings as it simplifies the experimental procedures and reduces the decision
complexity for agents.
A majority of previous works have used the DA for experimental studies of the MPS.
In particular, works by Plott (1983); Cason et al. (2003) and Kilkenny (2000) have em-
ployed the institution under non-trader settings. They report that the average efficiencies
observed in the experiments are approximately 98% and that the DA promises greater
flexibility and relief from administrative burdens than other schemes, even though in-
stability in the permit’s prices is observed. These MPS results are consistent with the
high efficiencies achieved under non-trader settings in other DA studies under general
settings such as Williams (1980) and Plott and Gray (1990).
Another group of studies, such as Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994); Godby
(1997); Muller et al. (2002) and Cason and Gangadharan (2006), also have used the
DA but under trader settings. The results of these experiments indicate that the observed
efficiencies exhibit higher variations and can be lower on average than the DA exper-
iments under non-trader settings, ranging between 60% and 98%. Furthermore, these
works report that the observed prices of permits could be unstable. In summary, the DA
under trader settings is more likely to generate lower efficiencies and less stable price
dynamics than those under non-trader settings. Some economists argue that agents have
more opportunities for speculative trades under trader settings and that this may be the
reason for the results (Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore, 1994).
Cason and Plott (1996) have conducted an experiment with the UPA under non-
trader settings. The work confirms that the UPA is very efficient in the MPS and induces
true revelation of abatement costs for pollution through the bids to buy and offers to sell
in the experiments. It is also found that the price dynamics are stable because the UPA is
9relatively simple and does not offer agents the opportunities of speculative trades in the
permit market. In summary, most of the research that has examined the performance of
MPS mechanisms has been conducted in controlled laboratory conditions with induced
value frameworks, irrespective of market institutions and of trader or non-trader settings
(Muller and Mestelman, 1998; Cason, 2010).
Some MPS markets are operated in the real world, especially in developed countries
such as the European union emissions trading scheme, and several empirical studies
were conducted to estimate their effectiveness (Ellerman and Montero, 1998; Montero,
1999; OECD, 2000; Newell et al., 2005; Ellerman and Montero, 2007; Ellerman et al.,
2010; Hahn and Stavins, 2011). However, these empirical studies have not addressed
or cannot identify how the market has achieved overall efficiency, i.e., market surplus
achieved under the MPS through permit trading. This is due to the fact that each agent
or firm in the market never reveals his private information of abatement costs to others,
otherwise there is no way for authorities to know the abatement costs. Therefore, there
has been no MPS research to explicitly report and compare the efficiency and applica-
bility in the field with those in laboratories.5 Furthermore, no previous works evaluate
the applicability of the MPS in the field of developing countries where depletion of nat-
ural resources such as forests is a more serious concern (FAO Forest Department, 2010,
2015).
Given this paucity, our research question becomes “how does the MPS perform and
achieve the overall efficiency in the field of developing nations?” To answer this ques-
tion, we conduct a framed field experiment of the MPS based on local farmers’ valuation
for forests and evaluate the overall efficiency and performance of the MPS as applied to
forest conservation in the field of Nepal. The setup of our field experiment is in contrast
5Levitt and List (2007) claim that the comparison between fields and laboratory ex-
periments is important for bridging the gap.
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to the laboratory setting with induced value frameworks. More specifically, we have
designed a novel setup of framed field experiments that is feasible in developing nations
and can be understood by the “real” subjects. We chose Shaktikhor in Nepal as a site
because the livelihoods of farmers highly depend on the forest and the farmers can natu-
rally report their valuations of forestry. First, we conducted a survey through which we
elicited valuations of local farmers for each unit of forestland, i.e., deriving the demand
and supply for forestland as well as for permits.6 Second, MPS experiments were car-
ried out with the UPA under trader settings based on the aggregate demand and supply
derived in the first stage. These experiments allow for observations of efficiencies, price
dynamics and revelation of valuations through bids to buy and offers to sell and enable
us to analyze the overall performance of the UPA in the real field.
Subjects in this field experiment were local forest users and farmers who have el-
ementary education. Many of them cannot make some arithmetic calculations, such
as a series of summations and subtractions, but they can understand which number is
larger when given two different numbers. Thus, they can compare and trade their forest
products in their daily life. With these facts in mind, we chose the UPA as a market
institution because it is simpler and more intuitive for local farmers regarding how they
incur the loss or to reap the benefit from the permit trades, compared to the real-time
trading of the DA. We chose a trader setting for our experimental design to reflect the
real-life condition of the MPS when applied to natural resource management. Due to
the aforementioned arguments, an additional novelty in this research lies in designing a
field experiment with real subjects of a developing country in comparison with a stan-
dard laboratory experiment of WEIRD subjects as claimed in Henrich et al. (2010b).7
6The permits are entitlements for the owners to utilize a single unit of forestland
for commercial purposes in a legal way. More detailed explanation for the definition of
permits will be given in later sections.
7Henrich et al. (2010b) claim that although behavioral scientists publish many re-
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The results suggest that the MPS is effective with high efficiency of 80% in the
field. In this success, the institution of the UPA is identified as a key element because
(i) farmers with elementary educations could understand and follow the rules of trading
and (ii) they are induced to reveal their valuations of forestland through their bids to buy
and offers to sell. To our knowledge, this study is the first to design and employ a UPA
institution under trader settings as well as to establish successful MPS performance in
the real-life conditions of developing nations. Overall, the MPS could be an effective
policy option for natural resources management, even for those with less administrative
expertise, limited educations and fewer resources to implement.
2.1.1 Overview of Community forestry in Nepal
Nepal is a landlocked country in South Asia that shares its northern border with the
People’s Republic of China and its borders to the south, east, and west with the Republic
of India. The total area of the country is 147 181 km2, 80% of which is covered by
hills and mountains and the land use of the country is divided as follows: forests 29%,
shrubs 11%, grassland 12%, cultivated land 30%. The rest is categorized as others such
rocky mountain 18% (FAO Forest Department, 2010, 2015). The total population of the
country is approximately 30 million, SI80% of which depend upon subsistence farming
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The forestry sector is very critical from socio-
cultural and economic points of view as farms, forests and livestock are interrelated
components of Nepal’s farming systems (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; Mahat et al., 1986).
The forest management system has undergone a structural shift away from privatization
search papers of human behavior with samples of population from western, educated,
industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies as a “standard” approach, such
WEIRD sample is something we should not consider as “standard.” They argue the
necessity of implementing behavioral experiments with less-standard samples.
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and nationalization toward voluntary participation systems (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991).
Prior to 1957, the forest management had been based on the indigenous practices of
local villagers who utilized the forest to meet their daily demands of fuel, fodder, poles,
and timber. The Private Forest Nationalization Act of 1957 nationalized the entire forest-
land which prevented people from utilizing forests to avoid deforestation (Gilmour et al.,
1989). Since 1978, a local institution “Community Forestry User Group” (hereafter,
CFUG) has managed the local forests as “community forest.” Inequality and poverty are
the major problems in this transitional phase, along with political instability, absence of
social reforms and imprudent utilization of resources (Gilmour et al., 1989).
Community forestry is a voluntary forestry management system in which the CFUG
members contribute labor to organizing some collective activities of forest protection
and management, such as meeting, harvesting, weeding, thinning, pruning and guard-
ing. In return, they are allowed to harvest non-timber products. Harvesting non-timber
products is highly labor-intensive. Poor households do not usually possess land and
cattle (Adhikari et al., 2004). Thus, firewood is the only non-timber product they are
motivated to harvest. Unfortunately, however, it is reported that such poor households
cannot sufficiently allocate their own labor for harvesting firewood because they are
swamped with daily agricultural labor works and do not have enough money to hire ad-
ditional external labor (Adhikari et al., 2007). Relatively high-income or middle-income
households within the CFUG usually possess land and cattle so that they are motivated
to harvest a variety of non-timber products such as leaf litter, fodder and thatching mate-
rials (Adhikari et al., 2007). Since they are not struggling with their daily life compared
to poor households, they can allocate their own time to harvest such non-timber products
or can even hire additional external labor. Therefore, poor households do not utilize the
opportunities of CFUG, while middle-income or high-income households utilize them
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more efficiently (Adhikari et al., 2004, 2007).
In summary, community forestry management as a participatory system had been
considered a viable solution to forestland preservation. However, it have resulted in un-
desirable outcomes for poor households due to the aforementioned problems. Previous
literature has supported this finding, and the community forestry management system
is claimed to be inefficient in its process because poor households are deprived of the
appropriation of resources and the benefits of sharing (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001; Ad-
hikari et al., 2004, 2007). Consequently, this system has not necessarily helped poor
people in Nepal, but has often worked to their disadvantage (Graner, 1997; Adhikari
et al., 2007). Gautam (1987) argues that the indigenous forest management is more eq-
uitable and effective in conserving nature’s integrity than community forestry because
the latter fails to achieve an equitable cost-benefit sharing arrangement for society. The
consequences of such a failure have led to inefficiencies and have opened the door to the
inceptions of feasible and alternative institutional setups for new forest management to
enhance the access of poorer households to the forest.
The MPS could be a solution when applied to forestland management, as it gives a
right to the people to utilize forest products without clear-cutting timbers. This approach
can provide equal rights to all individuals, and by holding the permits, each individual
can commercially utilize forestland under some controlled regulations. To implement
the MPS, local farmers are required to enter into a time contract to attain an arranged
number of permits for forestland use, in which they can carry out agro-forestry farm-
ing. Initial permits can be allocated equally without socio-economic discrimination and,
thus, the MPS can address inequitable distributions of resources through the allocation
of initial rights.
The Shaktikhor village development committee is located in Chitwan district of the
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Figure 2.1: The location of Shaktikhor, Chitwan in Nepal
southern part of Nepal, where we implemented our field experiments (See figure 2.1).
Chitwan district is rich in natural flora and fauna and is highly committed to species di-
versity. The word Chitwan itself means Heart of the Forest in the Nepali language. The
Shaktikhor village comprises a unique blend of diversified indigenous ethnic groups,
such as “Chepang,” who reside in approximately 1000 households that are involved in
agriculture and forestry.8 All of the hill forests at the study site are surrounded by agri-
cultural lands and have to fulfill the primary demands of rural households.
Subsistence farming in that region is based on a triangular relationship among the
farms, the cattle and the forests (Adhikari et al., 2004). Forestland is essential for these
people as it yields grass fodder for feeding livestock, leaf litter for composting, fuel-
wood for cooking and heating, timber and poles for constructing houses. Most of the
households’ daily routines are based on farming and harvesting of forest products to ful-
8The “Chepang” is an indigenous ethnic group that inhabits Shaktikhor. They tradi-
tionally practice slash-and-burn agriculture or simple hoe-based horticulture, along with
hunting and gathering in the forests.
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fill their primary needs. The literacy rate in Shaktikhor village is approximately 65%,
implying that most of the population has only an elementary-level education (Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In fact, many subjects could only perform simple calcula-
tion. However, they have a sense of valuing forestland and trading forest products based
on their daily experiences.
2.2 Experimental designs
This section provides an overview for the design of our framed field experiments.
First, we describe a study site, a feature of the subjects’ pool and how we elicited the
economic valuations (hereafter, EVs) of local farmers for each unit of forestland. We
next highlight how the information about EVs was utilized in the MPS with the UPA
for the conservation of forests in Shaktikhor, Nepal. Finally, we explain the procedure
and the general sequence of experiments. The field experiment was conducted at the
community hall, which was especially constructed for the “Tourism for Rural Poverty
Alleviation Program” by the Chitwan hill guides group. Subjects were randomly cho-
sen from five different villages in Shaktikhor, Nepal. A total of 40 subjects participated
in the experiment.9 They were farmers and CFUG members. We conducted four ses-
sions, each of which involved 10 subjects from different villages and consisted of 10
experimental periods. Each session lasted 3 hours on average. The summary of our ex-
perimental design is given in table 2.1. In the first stage, each subject had to go through
a survey interview for the elicitation of EVs for each unit of commercial forestland he
9Given the time & money constraints and geographic settings for our field exper-
iments, this is the maximum number of subjects we could collect. For instance, we
randomly picked forest users from different villages to avoid a situation where subjects
in a session know each other. It takes more than 5-7 hours to go from one village to an-
other village on foot where roads are not paved. Likewise, one subject needed to come
to the city hall for our field experiments by walking of 5 hours on average.
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(she) demands.
To fulfill this objective, we have asked each respondent about the maximum price
he (she) is willing to pay (WTP) for each unit of forestland, realizing the net benefit he
(she) could gain if the given unit is of commercial forest (See the row “Economic Value
(EV)” in table 2.2).10 If a person obtains a commercial forest unit, he (she) can utilize
the forest to harvest timber and non-timber products for commercial purposes following
the regulations of Nepalese government. Nevertheless, irrespective of the ownership
of commercial forests, the respondents have an obligation to participate in community
forestry management as described in the previous section.11 Thus, the economic valua-
tions we asked from respondents in this survey represent the net benefit of obtaining a
unit of land as commercial forests.
For some respondents, the economic valuations for a unit of commercial forests
could be low, because they may possess non-farming jobs or do not have enough re-
sources to fully utilize forests. For others, the economic valuations could be high, be-
cause they have some expertise in generating forest products with their management
practices and expect to have the large net benefits. In summary, through a series of
these WTP questions, we elicited the demand of each individual or household until his
or her WTPs for commercial forests arrived at zero or a negative value. For instance,
10Every subject in this framed field experiment possesses hands-on experiences in
practicing forest management, because people’s life in these areas is highly dependent
upon forests. When we elicited the WTP per unit of commercial forest, we asked sub-
jects to answer the WTP focusing only on the net “economic” value (EV) they can gain.
This question was easily answered by the subjects in our survey.
11We acknowledge that monitoring and enforcement for obligations or regulations in
managing community forestry are crucial issues for MPS, and there exist several works
that focus on this issue (Murphy and Stranlund, 2006, 2007, 2008). However, note that
monitoring and enforcement are out of our scope in this paper. This is because our
field experiment becomes too complex for subjects if we try to include that aspect in the
experimental design.
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Figure 2.2: Elicited demands for forestland and the supply of permits across each session
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table 2.2 exhibits a schedule of WTPs elicited from one respondent, with the reporting
of a zero WTP or negative value arriving at the 11th unit of forestland.12 The respon-
dents are very knowledgeable, experienced in forestry practices and have been trading
forest commodities in their everyday life. This satisfies the sufficient conditions for em-
ploying an open-ended question format (See, e.g., Cummings et al., 1986; Mitchell and
Carson, 1988). Fortunately, we have found that respondents did not have any difficulties
in reporting WTP values in the survey.
After the collection of EVs, we derived the aggregate demand of forestland for
each session as shown in figure 2.2. This figure consists of four subfigures, each of
which corresponds to the demand in each session. For instance, figure 2.2(c) shows
12Some respondents reported zero WTP for units of forestland less than 10, such as
8 or 5 units. In such cases, the EV cells for the units corresponding to zero WTP are
trimmed accordingly.
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the downward-sloping derived demand for commercial forestland in session 3. This is
derived by pooling and ranking the collected EVs of session 3 from high to low where
aggregate farmers’ demand (or WTPs) become zero at the 64th unit of forestland. Fig-
ures 2.2(a) to 2.2(d) are derived in the same way and demonstrate that their demands are
qualitatively similar in the sense that they are downward-sloping to the same degree and
becomes zero around the 60th unit of forestland.
We subsequently determined the capped level of commercial forestland provided
by the permits in the MPS. For this calculation, we referred to previous studies sug-
gesting that about 62% of a total forestland of 3.5 million hectares has been handed
to the CFUG for preservation where only non-timber products can be harvested mainly
for non-commercial purposes, and it is expected to be preserved up to 70% (Regmi,
2000). In this scenario of gradually transferring accessible forestland to the community
for preservation, we assume that 70% of forestland is conserved under current CFUG
schemes, while the rest of 30% is managed and utilized by the MPS. To mimic this sce-
nario, 30% of the total demand was allocated to subjects as marketable permits in the
field experiments. Given the conditions, the initial permit endowments were randomly
allocated to all subjects such that the total capped level was allotted to preserve 70%
of forestland. Table 2.2 shows that the subject has demanded 10 units of forestland and
is entitled to have 3 permits. In this way, the aggregate supply of permits was derived
for each session. For example, in session 3, 22 units were determined as the aggregate
supply, which is 30% of the total demand of 63 units (See figure 2.2(c)).13
Utilizing the information from the EVs of forestland, we can derive the demand and
13We admit that there might be a better way to determine an initial allocation of per-
mits. However, when each subject reported his or her EVs, he (she) did not know in
advance what types of experiments would proceed. Therefore, the way we have con-
ducted the initial allocation does not affect both the reporting behaviors of the subjects
and the results that follow.
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supply of permits in the UPA. As mentioned earlier, we employ the UPA under trader
settings. This means that each subject is required to submit his or her bids to buy and
offers to sell all at once in a single trading period. Specifically, each subject is asked
to submit his or her bids to buy, representing how much he (she) is willing to pay for
each additional unit of permits, as well as his or her offers to sell, representing the price
with which he is willing to sell for each unit of permits he (she) possesses. For instance,
consider a subject who is endowed with 3 permits and who faces an EV schedule in
table 2.2. In this case, he must submit 7 distinct bids to buy, each of which corresponds
to the potential purchase of the permits for the 4th, 5th, . . ., 10th units of forestland, and
3 distinct offers to sell, each of which corresponds to the potential sale of the permits
for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd units he (she) currently possesses.
If subjects are rational, the subjects’ bids to buy and offers to sell should theoretically
be very close to the EVs (Cason and Plott, 1996). In the experimental instructions by the
Nepali language, we clearly stated that if a bid to buy (an offer to sell) is higher (lower)
than the corresponding EV, then it may incur a loss. However, we did not repeatedly tell
them so. Additionally, such irrational behaviors are permitted, although some previous
research does prohibit such irrationality. This decision is motivated by the fact that we
sought to clarify whether the MPS under trader settings could be efficient for farmers
under the most primitive setting in Nepal.
Suppose that subjects are sufficiently rational and that they reveal their EVs through
bids to buy and offers to sell as predicted by economic theory. We can derive the aggre-
gate demand and supply for permits in each session by ranking the bids to buy from high
to low and the offers to sell from low to high. When the derived demand and supply are
plotted together, it yields an equilibrium volume of trade and an equilibrium price as the
intersection of the two curves. Figure 2.3, which consists of four subfigures, shows the
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Factors Experimental designs
Subjects Local farmers and members of CFUG
Location Shaktihore village development committee
Education level of subjects Illiterate or elementary level
Session and experimental periods 4 session, each consists of 10 periods
Market institution Uniform price auction
Time per session Approximately 180 minutes
Table 2.1: Summary of experimental design
Figure 2.3: Theoretical equilibrium of permit demand and supply in each session
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derived demand and supply for permits in each session. Figures 2.3(a) to 2.3(d) corre-
spond to sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. These four figures show that the demand
and supply for permits are slightly different across sessions, but the qualitative nature of
the markets appears to be close.
While there were neither computers nor internet connections in the field, everything
was managed manually by hiring research assistants for each session. Following the
general rule of the UPA, each subject does not know about the EVs of other subjects, and
the volumes of trade that occurred, and the corresponding payoffs of others. Subjects
were not allowed to communicate with each other during the period of trading and were
paid real money based on the cumulative payoffs of their decisions over 10 periods.
Given the aforementioned conditions, each subject was required to determine his or her
bids to buy and offers to sell at the same time in a single period. After the announcement
of the uniform price, they identified whether they would become buyers or sellers and
their payoffs for that period.
Suppose that a subject has the EVs for forestland as shown in table 2.2 and is en-
dowed with 3 units of initial permits. In this case, a subject is asked to submit 3 distinct
offers to sell and 7 distinct bids to buy. If the uniform price is announced as 18 500, this
subject buys two additional permits by paying 18 500 for each, because his bids to buy
for the corresponding units are higher than the price (21 000 and 19 000 for the 4th and
5th, respectively). In that trade, he must pay 37 000 (= 2 × 18 500) and will come into
possession of five permits, which gives him a gross benefit of 159 000 (the summation
of EVs from 1st and 5th units). His payoff in that period is the difference between the
two, that is, 122 000 (= 159 000 − 37 000). The further details of the rules and of the
auction mechanism of the UPA employed in this study are summarized in the appendix.
Many subjects do not have good math skills. Therefore, the calculations of the
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payoffs were double-checked by research assistants. However, each subject appeared
to understand the types of situations in which he (she) incurred losses or obtained more
benefits from trading. We instructed subjects to trade in a way that they seek to obtain
more benefits from trading. This explanation was selected because many subjects have
only limited educations but do have a sense of trading for forest products in a local
market. Typically, our participants were paid the equivalent of almost US $2 in the
local currency as a show-up fee. At the end of the session, experimental rupees were
converted to real NPR at the rate of 1000 experimental rupees = NPR 1, with each
subject earning a minimum of NPR 500 and a maximum of NPR 2000 for an average
of NPR 800 which is equivalent to approximately $12. This is a high stake for typical
farmers in that region, as their daily earnings range from $4 to $7.
2.3 Experimental results
This section provides the details of the experimental results. The first subsection
gives an overview of the demand for forestland by the farmers of Shaktikhor and the
derived demand and supply of marketable permits. The second subsection reports the
overall efficiency gains from the trading. The third subsection shows the observed equi-
librium price behaviors and the associated volumes of trades. The final subsection ad-
dresses the trading behavior of individuals regarding their strategies for “bids to buy”
and “offers to sell.”
2.3.1 Elicitation of economic valuation for forestland
The demand and supply of marketable permits in each session are derived, based
upon the demand for forestland elicited by the survey. Figure 2.2, consisting of four
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subfigures, shows the aggregate demand for forestland elicited from 10 subjects in each
session. Figures 2.2(a) to 2.2(d) correspond to the aggregate demands in sessions 1, 2, 3
and 4, respectively. From a comparison of the four figures, we can see that they are not so
different qualitatively and that the total aggregate demand in a session is approximately
60Khatta.14 Furthermore, the intersection of the supply and demand occurs around NPR
20 000 in each session. This value could be considered an equilibrium price of permits
in the MPS.
The derived demand and supply curves are in figure 2.3, which consists of four
subfigures, each exhibiting the demand and supply for the permits in each session. As
mentioned earlier, the demand and supply for permits, respectively, represent the “bids
to buy,” as arranged from highest to lowest and the “offers to sell,” as arranged from
lowest to highest, assuming that the subjects are rational (See figures 2.3(a) to 2.3(d)).
When subjects are rational, they should submit their bids to buy and offers to sell that are
close to their own EVs. Therefore, we should be able to observe the similar demand and
supply for permits in the experimental results as derived in figure 2.3 for each session.
The initial endowments of sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are 24, 20, 22 and 18 permits, re-
spectively. The trades of 6, 9, 12 and 8 should occur with the equilibrium prices, or
equivalently, the uniform prices of NPR 16 000, NPR 22 500, NPR 20 000 and NPR
25 000 in sessions 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Accordingly, the market surplus is identi-
fied as the area surrounded by the derived demand and supply on the domain between 0
and the equilibrium price. The information about the market in each session is summa-
rized in table 2.3. Note again that subjects’ actual bids to buy and offers to sell would
deviate from the EVs derived in figure 2.3 if they do not understand the rule of the MPS
with the UPA or if they are irrational. In this case, losses of market surplus (or efficiency
14One unit of “Khatta” in the Nepali language is equivalent to approximately 500m2
of land.
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losses) would be realized.
The equilibrium prices derived in figure 2.3 appear to be plausible, reflecting the
current incomes and the price levels of the villagers in Shaktikhor, Nepal. These derived
markets exhibit across 4 sessions an average equilibrium price of around NPR 22 000
per Khatta of forestland, where arable land price is approximately NPR 100 000 per
Khatta.15 The crop intensity in Nepal is known to be higher in the mid-hills geographic
areas such as Shaktikhor, our field site. For instance, 4 to 5 types of crops are cultivated
in the arable land of Shaktikhor over a year and it can sustain the lives of a family
of 4 to 5 members for approximately 3-4 months (See Chhetri, 2011). In such cases,
forest products can function only as complementary goods to the crops produced in such
arable land. Hence, forestry products are not considered the main products for the lives
of villagers, rather the complements to agriculture or a living itself. This observation is
consistent with the fact that the price of forestland is a quarter of the arable land price.
Thus, the elicited demand from the local farmers at Shaktikhor, Nepal, is very plausible.
15The heterogeneous group of farmers from the five different villages and the com-
munity forestry user group determined this equilibrium price with a small variation of
the equilibrium price: a minimum of NPR 16 000 and a maximum of NPR 25 000 (See
figure 2.3).
Session 1 2 3 4
Total demand for commercial forest 75 62 63 57
Total permits supply 24 20 22 18
Efficient equilibrium price (NPR) 16 000 22 500 20 000 25 000
Efficient trade volume 6 9 12 8
Table 2.3: Summary of market information per session
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2.3.2 Market efficiency, price dynamics and trade volume
Efficiency
The maximum possible surplus (hereafter, theoretical surplus) is the triangular area
between the supply and demand curves to the left of their intersection (See figure 2.3).
The efficiencies were measured as a ratio between the surplus obtained from a single
experimental period’s market and the theoretical surplus. If the surplus that was obtained
from the market in a single trading period is equivalent to the theoretical surplus, then
100% efficiency gain is considered to be achieved, or equivalently, if the permit trading
in a single experimental period yields the maximum surplus from exchanges.
Figure 2.4, which consists of four subfigures, shows the efficiency gains from per-
mit trading by subjects across 10 periods in each session. The least efficiency gain is
observed in session 4 (See figure 2.4(d) and the 30% efficiency of period 4) and the
highest efficiency gain is observed in session 3 (See figure 2.4(c) and the 100% effi-
ciency in some periods). However, in total, the efficiency levels observed during the
periods have heterogeneous patterns across sessions that range between 60% and 90%,
regardless of exceptions (See figure 2.4). By pooling all of the observed efficiency gains
over the 10 periods in each session, the average efficiency is calculated to be 80%, with
a corresponding standard deviation 20%.
As mentioned earlier, a certain degree of variation in the efficiency gains is observed
across the sessions (See figure 2.4). The degree of the efficiency gains from trading is
known to be sensitive to the structure of demand and supply as well as to the charac-
teristics of subject pools. Although the derived supply and demand for permits in each
session are not so different qualitatively, some hidden heterogeneous factors may have
contributed to the variation of efficiency gains in our field experiment. In fact, we admit
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Figure 2.4: Observed efficiency gains over the periods across each session
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that a small portion of subjects appeared to be confused with the rule of trading at the
initial stage in some sessions, especially, during session 4. In that session, we observed
that such confusion led to very irrational bidding and offering strategies and contributed
to the loss of efficiency gains.16 However, as additional periods passed, we also have
found that such confusion gradually disappeared in most cases of sessions 1, 2 and 3.
In summary, the UPA under trader settings in our experiments has shown high ef-
ficiency of 80% on average. In comparison to the prior laboratory experiments on the
UPA and the DA, the statistics and observed efficiencies reported earlier are consistent
with previous works (Cason and Plott, 1996). For instance, Cason and Plott (1996)
report an efficiency gain of 90.9% using more educated subjects and a UPA under a
non-trader setting. Because our experiment was conducted in the field with less ed-
ucated subjects under a trader setting, the 10% decline of efficiency observed in our
experiment could be considered legitimate. Overall, we would say that the observed
efficiencies are high enough that the MPS is effective in the real-life conditions of the
field.
Market prices and trade volume
Figure 2.5, which consists of four subfigures, depicts the evolution of the observed
prices in the UPA market over the periods of each session. In figure 2.5, a solid line rep-
resents the level of theoretical equilibrium prices (hereafter, TEP) and a solid diamond
marker represents the observed uniform price per period for each session. Overall, the
results suggest that the UPA generated observed equilibrium prices that are not so far
from the TEP and can be considered close to it except for session 4 (see and compare
16In session 4, we could not observe that efficiencies rise over periods. This is due
to the fact that a few subjects seem not to have consistent strategies for bids to buy and
offers to sell throughout that session.
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Figure 2.5: Observed movement of prices over the periods across each session
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figures 2.5(a) to 2.5(d)).
Most of the observed prices range between NPR 15 000 and NPR 25 000. The great-
est deviation between the TEP and the observed price is visible in session 4. As men-
tioned earlier, we realize that in that session, some subjects did not follow the usual
trading or consistent strategies under the UPA as argued by Smith and Williams (1982)
and Cason and Plott (1996) because of the confusion they had at the initial stages, and
this may be the main reason for the large discrepancy between the TEP and the observed
prices of that session.
Table 2.4 presents the average units of permits traded across the sessions and the
theoretical trade volume. The results show that an average of 70% of the theoretical
trade volume was realized. The average number of permits traded remained less than
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the predicted trade volume across the sessions (See table 2.4). This result is quite consis-
tent with past literature on the UPA in the sense that the volume of trades that occurs in
experiments tends to be less than the theoretical volume of trades. This information re-
garding the actual trade volume indicates that substantial trades have occurred although
they are not always identical to the predicted trade volume. This result could be argued
in relation to endowment effects, which will be detailed later.
2.3.3 Demand revelation
This subsection reports how the subjects revealed their demands for forestland
through bids to buy and offers to sell and considers whether there is a qualitative dif-
ference between the two in our MPS experiments. This analysis is important because
efficiency gains are more likely to rise when subjects are induced to reveal their true val-
uations for forestland through market exchange. Economic theory predicts that a UPA
will tend to induce demand revelation at a margin if a subject behaves optimally, which
means that he (she) should submit his or her “bids to buy” and “offer to sell” near the
EVs (See Cason and Plott, 1996).
In figures 2.6 and 2.7, a circle mark represents each observed bid to buy and offer to
sell, the straight line represents a 45 degree slope, and a thick line represents the median
regression line estimated with the data which will be explained later. In these figures, we
can observe that bidding and offering behaviors are positively correlated with the EVs,
and a persistent tendency to submit “bids to buy” below the EVs and “offers to sell”
above the EVs. This means that many circle marks exist below the 45 degree line for
bids to buy and above it for offers to sell (See figures 2.6 and 2.7). We can also confirm
that this behavioral pattern applies to many participants by looking at each individual
data. To clarify the positive correlation between the actual behaviors of subjects and
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Figure 2.6: Bids to buy
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000
Bi
ds
 to
 b
uy
 
Economic valuation (EV) 
Bids_to_buy
45 degree
Med_reg
their EVs, we obtain an slope estimate by running the median regression, in which the
observed bids and offers are taken as dependent variables and the corresponding EV
values are the independent variable. Note that if this regression is close to the 45 degree
line, it means that the subjects are induced to reveal their true values through their bids
to buy and offers to sell.
The regression is specified as follows:
bidi = β0 + β1vi + ε (2.1)
offeri = β0 + β1vi + ε (2.2)
where bidi is an observed bid to buy, and offeri is an offer to sell as revealed by subject
i during the experiments, vi is the corresponding EV for the unit of forestland, β0 and
β1 are the parameters and ε is defined as the stochastic error term. Note that if the
estimates in the above median regressions produce a zero intercept and a slope of 1,
then the subjects are considered to have 100% demand revelation.
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Session 1 2 3 4
Efficient trade volume 6 9 12 8
Average trade volume 4.7 6.6 9.1 4.5
Median 5 6.5 9 4.5
Mode 5 6 9 5
Standard deviation 1.05 1.34 0.56 1.5
Table 2.4: Observed trade volume per session
Figure 2.7: Offers to sell
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Then, the estimates for each of the bids to buy and offers to sell are obtained as
follows:
b̂idi = 666.67
(90.99)
+ 0.67
(0.0042)
vi, Pseduo R2 = 0.57, T = 1740,
ôfferi = −753.89
(753,89)
+ 1.53
(0.020)
vi, Pseduo R2 = 0.23, T = 840.
The numbers in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The estimation from
this model shows that both of the slope estimates β1 are positive and statistically sig-
nificant, although the magnitudes are different from the regressions for bids to buy and
offers to sell. With respect to the estimates of the intercepts, we can clearly see that the
bids to buy regression has a positive intercept value, while the offers to sell regression
has a negative intercept value. Based on these regression results, it seems that the de-
mand revelation through bids to buy and offers to sell has not been perfectly rendered in
our experiment, but the bids to buy and offers to sell are positively correlated with the
corresponding EVs to a certain extent of statistical significance. Therefore, we say that
a UPA induces at least a partial demand revelation to such an extent that efficiency gains
become approximately 80% on average.
The reasons for the difference of regression results between the bids to buy and
the offers to sell associated with the partial demand revelation could be attributed to
several factors. At this point, we conjecture that endowment effects may be potentially
present in our experiment. Note that our experiments were conducted in the field and
asked subjects to think of the “real” good of forestland, which is different from the
controlled laboratory experiment reported in the literature. Most of prior works employ
a neutral terminology to describe marketable permits by expressing them as coupons and
pollution as production. In contrast, we have used the term “forest” directly throughout
the experiments because of our intent to explore the efficiencies of the MPS for real
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forest management practices.
In our experimental environment, endowment effects can induce the subjects to over-
report their offers to sell for each permit in relation to the corresponding EVs (See
figure 2.7. Almost all of offers to sell are located above the 45 degree line and the degree
of over-reporting is very large). The previous works of Knetsch and Sinden (1987) and
Kahneman et al. (1990) have established that if subjects are endowed with real goods,
then substantially fewer trades have occurred in comparison to the trades theoretically
predicted in the absence of endowment effects. The endowment effects might have
reduced the gains from trade in our experiments. Fortunately, the results demonstrate
that efficiency losses from the effects are not so significant, and that our UPA institution
could be considered efficient in the field even in the presence of endowment effects.
Overall, the market performances observed in our experiment, with the UPA institu-
tion under trader settings with real subjects, are quite consistent with the result of Cason
and Plott (1996), although some endowment effects were observed in our cases. These
data indicate that the UPA institution’s market performances, even under trader settings
in the field, do not significantly fall shorter than the results under non-trader settings in
laboratory experiments. Finally, we claim that the market allocation of permits through
the UPA can be efficient and socially desirable with an appropriate scheme of the initial
allocation and can improve equitable welfare distribution along with the preservation of
forestland resources.
2.3.4 Discussion
Our results can potentially provide some implication not only to forest conservation
in Nepal but also to other cases. Currently, the implementation of the REDD+ program
has been reviewed in Nepal and in many other parts of the countries to stop worldwide
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rapid deforestation (Sukhdev et al., 2012; FAO Forest Department, 2015). This program
is an effort to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives
for people in developing countries to reduce emissions from forestland and to invest in
low-carbon paths to sustainable development. The REDD+ goes beyond deforestation
and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
The MPS induces forest users who are innovative and productive to buy and hold
more forestland and the REDD+ program is considered an additional source of bene-
fits for such productive forest users. However, this does not mean that less productive
forest users suffer. The existence of the REDD+ program together with the MPS shall
strongly motivate forest users to be more productive, implying that overall efficiency
gain achieved under the MPS can be larger based on our experimental results. In such
a situation, less productive users should be able to sell the land with higher prices and
gain more benefit as well, leading to more overall efficiency. In this sense, the REDD+
program can reinforce the effectiveness of the MPS for forest management. Therefore,
evaluating the potential efficiencies of the MPS for forest management through field ex-
periments in other parts of the world shall be more important and our results could be
considered a benchmark for the future research.
By analogy, the MPS of our field experiments could be related to other land use
issues such as potential conflicts between development and conservation of farmland,
preserving country-side amenity, protection of natural environment and so on. Due to
heavy pressures from urban sprawl and rise in agricultural demand, many countries face
potential depletion of wilderness and natural environment. For example, USA, European
countries, say, Germany, Switzerland, and Netherlands, Asian countries, Indonesia and
Philippines as well as South American countries, Brazil and Costa Rica, face the similar
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type of problems. Starting in the 1970s, the transferable development rights (hereafter,
TDR, or equally the MPS) have been implemented to address the land use problems
in more than one hundred locations of USA, while most countries have not adopted
the TDR yet (Renard, 2007; Pruetz and Standridge, 2009; Corkindaie, 2013). To the
best of our knowledge, the TDR efficiencies have not been addressed empirically in
the field, and such evaluation is going to be important for further application of TDRs.
Our research implies that the efficiencies of TDR applied to many types of land use
in these countries can be evaluated through field experiments, and it is likely that high
efficiencies in TDR field experiments are observed.
2.4 Conclusion
This framed field experiment was designed to develop the MPS under cap and trade
schemes for the management of forestland at Shaktikhor, Nepal. This attempt was made
to fill the gap in the literature in that the performance of the MPS applied to real resource
management in the context of a developing nation has not been yet explored. Therefore,
this paper has reported the efficiencies and potentials of the MPS by the field experi-
ments with some novel features: (i) implementation of the UPA under trader settings
in the field and (ii) representative simulation of economic decisions made by the local
farmers with elicited demand for forestland. Equilibrium prices per Khatta forestland
development were derived through the observed trades in field experiments, using the
elicited demand and supply relationships of permits involving 40 farmers.
The experimental results show that the MPS was effective with high efficiency of
80% in the real-life conditions of the field. The UPA is considered to be a key element
for this result because the UPA could perform with simple market information, and
farmers with elementary educations could understand and follow the rules of trading.
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Consequently, they were induced to reveal their valuations of forestland through bids
to buy and offers to sell, such that the overall experimental outcome lies closer to the-
oretically efficient markets, although endowment effects and some irrational behaviors
are observed. In addition, the UPA has shown stable price dynamics for the market as
substantial trades have occurred in the MPS for forestland development. Furthermore,
this result shows a good scope for the MPS and potential to be an effective policy option
for the practice of natural resources management with less administrative burden.
Another important point to mention is that through the markets elicited across the
four sessions of experimentation, an average equilibrium price was estimated at NPR
22 000 per Khatta of forestland. The prime factors that contribute to this price of forest-
land are distinctive valuations among the people and their dependency on forest re-
sources; hence, they can comprehend its costs and benefits based on their daily life
experiences in forest. Again, recall that these values are elicited from the local farmers
of the Shaktikhor village development committee, Nepal, and it is highly plausible con-
sidering their present conditions for price levels, living standards and commercial land
prices, as mentioned earlier.
The MPS itself does not always guarantee an efficient market to emerge through
simply asking people to trade marketable permits. This study could be considered an
illustration of how the MPS is a flexible and cost-effective market instrument that could
potentially play a vital role in addressing real world natural resource problems. Here, we
admit that the inception of marketable permits for forest conservation in rural parts of
Nepal is a very difficult task in reality. However, our field experiments have shown that
even local farmers can achieve high efficiency gains under UPA institutions, which may
be considered an important first step toward realistic application of the MPS to natural
resource conservation. As an implication of our results, the farmers who highly value
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forestland resources will benefit from buying permits and those who put a low value
will benefit by selling the permits. Hence, the issues of social injustice and the unfair
welfare distribution of forest resources to rural households of a country like Nepal can
be solved. Finally, a governing body should be very vigilant about changes in the scope
and motivations of trading to keep trades free from market speculation.
For the future research, there are several possible research topics emanating from
this work. It appears that endowment effects play important roles in our field exper-
iments. However, we did not vary the distributions of permits as a control and thus
could not identify how initial endowments of permits to subjects affect the overall per-
formance. We conjecture that endowment effects play more significant roles in the field
than in the laboratory. Another possible direction of the future research is evaluation
of efficiencies in transferable development rights (TDRs) for preservation of wilderness
and so on as mentioned in discussion section. There are several places where TDRs have
been implemented, however, the TDR efficiencies have never been evaluated in the field
experiments. This shall be an important research for further applications of the TDRs.
In summary, this paper has employed the UPA institution under trader settings in
the real-life conditions of a developing nation, involving local farmers with elementary
educations, which itself could be considered a pioneering work in the sphere of experi-
mental research.
2.5 Appendix
Illustration of experiment design:
In one session, 10 numbers of periods are conducted and in each period subjects earn
”experimental money” by trading ”Permits” however, subjects did not know before how
many periods they are going to trade until the end of the experiment. Subject’s earnings
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in each period are determined as follows: Payoff = Net benefit (EV, here after) from
forestland + Sale proceeds from selling permits - Amount spent on buying permits.
Why permits are required?
Permits are necessary for farmers to utilize forestland in a way they wish, enjoying for-
est product and resources, otherwise they have bear the cost of forestland maintenance
by employing labor and time, in other words they have to bear obligation of forestland
protection. However, people having the permits are not allowed to do clear cutting, but
they can solely enjoy EV of the forestland that they receive as endowment. If anybody
wants to have further forestland to develop and utilize he has to buy permits and those
who does not want to utilize forestland that can simply sell their permits to others and
receive the permits price and maintain rest of his unit of community forestland as obliga-
tion. Subjects have a chance to trade ”permits” in each period following the compliance
rule:
“Permits”= 30% of the total land demand
“Obligation”= 70% of the total land demand Total forest land demanded 100% = Permits
+ Obligation
Everyone starts with different number of ”permits” as they have different demand
for forestland in every session and they can adjust their own holding of ”permits” by
buying and selling them in a market that will operate. If subject, sell the permits, their
cash increases by the sales amount, and if subject buy permits, their cash decreases by
the sale amount. Later, we explain the rules for buying and selling permits.
Why subject might want to buy permits?
Remember as mentioned above permits will allow subjects to develop or utilize forest-
land in a way he wish. See table 2.2, this subject has 10 units (1st to 10th) of forestland
demand as per his given EV. He currently hold 3 permits, 1st, 2nd and 3rd units which
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he can solely enjoy and the remaining 7 units, (4th to 10th ) he is supposed to maintain
is as an obligation. Therefore, total forestland demand is 10 units (7 units obligation +
3 units permit). For instance EV of fourth unit is 22000 so if subject can buy a coupon
for less than 22000, this might be a good idea since he is getting forestland in cheaper
value. More specifically, if you subject buy permits for 21000, he get surplus of 1000
= (22000 - 21000) because of the lower value of that unit by some other people. In this
case, subject will maintain 6 units of forestland and can develop 4 units of forestland
with 4 permits that he receives. Note that the same logic applies when subject wants
to buy an additional permit to increase surplus from each of 5th, 6th and 10th units of
forestland.
Why might subject want to sell permits?
Continuing the illustration based on the previous example, suppose that subject currently
hold 3 permits with corresponding EV. The EV of 1st unit is 35,000 but if he can sell a
permit of the 1st unit for more than 35000, this might be a good idea since these sales
revenues exceed his value of this 1st unit. For example, if he sell a coupon of the 1st 2nd
and 3rd unit for higher then his value, even he incur the additional 3 units of forestland as
obligation, but still get a higher value for his permits which would increase his surplus.
In this case, he will take 10 units of forestland and will hold no permits.
Trading rules of coupons
The authority requires that, in each period, subject must submit bids to buy price at
which subject want to buy each additional unit of permit that he will obtain and an offer
to sell price at which he would sell each additional unit of permit that he has. In other
words, refer table 2.2, this subject has 3 permits, then he has to submit 3 distinct offers
to sell at which he would sell for each permit he hold, and also have to submit 7 distinct
bids to buy at which he would buy for each permit he might obtain. Therefore, the
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general rule for submitting offers to sell and bids to buy is written as follows:
The number of offers to sell + the number of bids to buy = total permit demand for
forestland
One session consists of 10 participants and 10 periods. After the offers and bids
from all participants are collected, the authority ranks all bids to buy from highest to
lowest and offers to sell from lowest to highest.
For example, imagine that aggregate demand by 10 participants for forestland per-
mits in one session is 43 units where 13 units of permits are supply, 30 units of permits
are demand. Each subject submits distinct offers to sell and bids to buy. Then the
authority will receive 13 distinct offers to sell and 30 distinct bids to buy
Finally, the authority will create a ranking for these offers and bids as shown in table
2.8. Here, units of permits are traded in order from left to right as long as the bids to
buy exceed or equal the matching offers to sell. In the example of table, the highest 12
bids to buy and the lowest 12 offers to sell are accepted as trades.
The uniform market price, which is paid by all buyers and is received by all sellers,
is determined as the average of the bid to buy and offer to sell of the last unit traded.
In this example, the last unit traded is 12th unit of permit and therefore, the uniform
market price is 20000= (20000+20000) /2 and all units traded in this market are bought
and sold at this price. After the authority announces this uniform price, trade occur and
pay off is calculated as mentioned earlier.
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Figure 2.8: Ranking of offers to sell and bids to buy to determine uniform price
Permit Bid to buy Offer to sell
1 80000 8000
2 80000 8500
3 80000 9000
4 80000 10000
5 50000 10000
6 50000 10000
7 50000 14000
8 35000 15000
9 30000 15000
10 28000 18000
11 25000 20000
12 20000 20000
13 20000 25000
14 16000
15 15000
16 13000
17 13000
18 12000
19 11000
20 10000
21 10000
22 10000
23 9000
24 8000
25 8000
26 8000
27 7000
28 7000
29 6000
30 6000
Chapter 3
Sustainability of common pool resources
3.1 Introduction
Capitalism has become a dominant social regime over the last several decades
(Piketty, 2014). Economic theory claims that goods and services are “efficiently” pro-
duced, allocated and consumed through competitive markets in capitalism, and this
efficient property serves as the main engine of economic growth (Schumpeter, 1942).
However, some of these principles do not appear to function in reality as theory pre-
dicts. For instance, intra- and inter-generational allocations of environmental goods and
natural resources are claimed to be inefficient under capitalistic conditions as illustrated
by climate change trends and the depletion of the world’s forests. Thus, resource sus-
tainability has become a key issue of a growing concern in relation to capitalism.
When natural resources are provided as commons, they are typically referred to
as common pool resources (hereafter, CPRs). In the CPR allocations, individuals are
known to face a coordination problem of social dilemmas and a sustainability problem of
depletion (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990) states that individuals
tend to lose their ability for coordination in social dilemmas unless they are facilitated
through communications and monitoring. Interestingly, however, Fruteau et al. (Fruteau
et al., 2013) have shown that animals such as vervet monkeys overcome social dilemmas
without any intervention. It thus remains an open question whether or not humans have
coordination abilities to solve the dilemma to sustainably manage CPRs.
Economists have long examined the CPR dilemmas via experimental methods.
Walker and Gardner’s paper is a pioneering work in the examination of CPRs in exper-
imental settings (Walker and Gardner, 1992). Additional studies have examined CPR
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games through laboratory experiments that mimic some environments observed in the
field (e.g., the probabilistic destruction of the commons and various strategic situations)
(Keser and Gardner, 1999; Cardenas, 2011; Janssen et al., 2011). Decision-making pro-
cesses and preferences of actual resource users for CPRs have been examined through
field experiments (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004; Velez et al., 2009; Cardenas, 2011;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011). All of these field studies have been conducted in static
or repeated-game settings, and show that some external devices such as information
provisions and other-regarding preferences are essentials to CPR solutions. Another
group of works explicitly incorporates resource dynamics in the CPR experiments and
analyzes how the dynamic nature of resources affects the outcomes compared with static
or repeated cases (Herr et al., 1997; Mason and Phillips, 1997; Bru et al., 2003; Kim-
brough and Vostroknutov, 2015). These studies have demonstrated that the regeneration
processes of CPRs critically affect the sustainability of resource use. From these works,
other studies have introduced inter-generational allocation and process uncertainties of
resource dynamics, showing that the one-way nature of inter-generations and process
uncertainties compromise sustainability (Fisher et al., 2004; Botelho et al., 2014). More
recent works have theoretically analyzed the dynamics of public resources and people’s
cooperation in spatial public goods game (Wakano et al., 2009; Xia et al., 2012; Zhu
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015, 2016). These works suggest that reputation, mobility and
neighborhood environments are important determinants for solving social dilemmas in
a dynamic spatial environment.
Ostrom discusses that individuals can organize sustainable resource use in spe-
cific socio-ecological environments that enable interpersonal communication and mon-
itoring (Ostrom, 2009). This points to the importance of identifying dynamic socio-
ecological factors to enhance self-organization through analyzing collective human be-
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haviors rather than imposing top-down rules. Accordingly, several recent works have
reported how socio-ecological environments, societal network and reciprocity influence
cooperation among individuals in a evolutionary perspective (Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;
Wang et al., 2013, 2015). Individual cooperative behaviors in the eastern and western
Germany have been studied in consideration of the different social histories of these
regions (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011). Authors find that
subjects from the eastern region act more selfishly than those of the western region.
Fishermen of individualistic lake-based fisheries are more competitive than those in col-
lective sea-based fisheries, suggesting that daily practices with others in workplaces
affect human behaviors and preferences (Leibbrandt et al., 2013).
The sustainability of natural resources is claimed to be endangered worldwide, as
many countries are now moving toward more competitive environments. As socio-
ecological environments are established to affect human nature, it is necessary to an-
alyze how the ongoing modernization of competitive environments, i.e., “capitalism,”
affects natural resource use. Despite their importance, no works have addressed these
issues and thus this paper seeks to discuss how the degree of capitalism in societies char-
acterizes individual prosociality, behaviors and CPR sustainability in the fields. To this
end, we design and implement a set of dynamic CPR games and experiments in the two
types of Nepalese areas, urban (capitalistic) and rural (non-capitalistic) areas. Nepalese
areas are studied, because Nepal is characterized by relatively uniform ethnic, religious
and cultural demographics, but has wide disparities between rural and urban areas with
respect to daily life practices. The features of Nepal allow us to control for degrees of
capitalism in our field experiments without experiencing confounding factors.
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3.2 Methods and materials
The field experiments of the CPR game incorporate resource dynamics in such a way
that subjects with limited education understand. A group of 4 subjects is formed. Each
subject is informed of the group size but not of the identities of the group members.
Subjects are also told that the group members would remain the same. The resource
stock at the beginning of each period is denoted by xt, where the subscript denotes time
periods of t = 1, 2, . . ., and an initial stock size, x1, of 120 is given. At the beginning
of each period t, subject i is asked to determine his/her individual harvest yi,t. The
escapement, st, is defined as st = xt −
∑4
j=1 yj,t where
∑4
j=1 yj,t is the group harvest
at period t. When st ≥ 0, then the individual payoff is pii,t = yi,t. When st < 0, the
individual payoff, pii,t, is yi,t = xt4 for simplicity. The escapement, st, is considered to be
a remaining stock for each period t and determines the evolution of resource dynamics.
The resource stock dynamics are specified as
xt+1 =

1.5st = 1.5
(
xt −
∑4
j=1 yj,t
)
st > 0
0 st ≤ 0.
In this model, the next-period stock xt+1 grows up to a 50% increase in the escapement,
and the game continues to the next period when st > 0 (the remaining stock is strictly
positive). Otherwise, resource depletion results and the CPR game is terminated.
To simulate realistic conditions, we incorporate time discounting in the CPR games.
We use total 20 chips in a box where 19 chips are white and 1 chip is red. The game can
move to the next period when a representative of each group picks one chip and the chip
is white. If a red chip is selected, the game is terminated for that group. This situation
resembles the discount factor of ρ = 0.95 in terms of time preferences. In summary,
our CPR games are terminated when a group depletes the resource, i.e., st ≤ 0, or when
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the red chip is selected by a group representative. With this setup, we are interested
in identifying how many periods each group can sustain resource use in the games.
The period at which each group terminates the game via resource depletion or chip
selection is referred to as the “terminal period.” This is a measurement of the degree of
sustainability.
This CPR game is designed to capture key factors of resource sustainability, reflect-
ing some fundamental features of CPR utilization in the real world: (i) strategic uncer-
tainty with anonymity, (ii) dynamic evolution of resources and (iii) time preferences of
resource users. The game is framed within a resource utilization problem of multiple
players on an infinite horizon, and it uses the following predictions of Nash equilibrium
and Pareto optimality. One symmetric Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (potentially the
simplest and played most frequently) states that each subject harvests the resource to
exhaustion at an initial period. Pareto optimal allocation occurs when each subject in
a group allows the resource to grow, and the group harvests the entire resource at once
at the terminal period of budget and time constraints. The subjects are told that they
may be asked to stop playing the game due to the “terminal period of budget and time
constraints” if the game continues for too long.
The dynamic CPR field experiments were conducted in two types of Nepalese re-
gions. The Kathmandu and Pokhara districts are urban, and the Chitwan and Parbat
districts are rural (figure 3.1). The Kathmandu and Pokhara districts are the first and
second largest cities in Nepal, respectively, and these are the most highly populated
areas in the country where most residents work in business, service and government
sectors. The Chitwan and Parbat districts are rural areas consisting of small villages that
are less densely populated where most residents work in the agriculture or forestry sec-
tors. To ensure the random assignment of groups, subjects were selected from different
48
cities and villages in cooperation with local NGOs and offices for each session. In using
this approach, we avoided recruiting participants who knew one another.
Figure 3.1: The locations of fields: Kathmandu and Pokhara as urban areas and Parbat
and Chitwan as rural areas
A total of 528 subjects participated in this experiment, which is the maximum num-
ber of subjects that we could recruit under our time and budget constraints. As each
group includes 4 subjects in the CPR game, the 67 groups and 65 groups of 268 and 260
subjects for the urban and rural areas were formed, respectively. In each session, 5 ∼ 8
groups convened in one place, and subjects were not allowed to communicate with one
another. On average, each session of the CPR games and questionnaires lasted 3 hours.
The subjects are told that the CPR game begins with an initial group token (initial re-
source stock) of 120 for each group, and that the next period would be reached as long
as the resource is not depleted by the group members and as long as the red chip is not
selected by the group representative. We described the resource and its dynamics using
neutral terminology. The resource stock and escapement are expressed as “tokens” and
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“remaining tokens” for that given period, and the “next-period tokens” grow by 50%
for the remaining tokens. We did not have access to computers or an internet connection
in the field. The sessions were thus managed manually by experimenters and research
assistants for each session.
At the start of each period, subjects were given the information on the group tokens
and were asked to make an individual decision on how many tokens they would take.
After the individual decisions were made, the participants were informed of the group
harvest and of the remaining tokens. However, they were not informed of group mem-
bers’ individual harvests. Unless no tokens were left, a representative of each group
was randomly chosen to select one chip from a box with 19 white chips and 1 red chip.
When a white chip was selected, the group moved to the next period. After completing
the CPR games, we administered questionnaires on socio-demographic information and
the social value orientation (SVO) game (adopting the “Slider Method”) for identifying
subjects’ social preferences (Murphy et al., 2011). Subjects were paid real money based
on the cumulative payoffs of their decisions made during the experiments including the
SVO and CPR games in addition to a show-up fee in the local currency valued at US $2.
Experimental rupees were converted to the Nepalese rupee (hereafter, NPR) at a rate of
1 experimental token = 2 NPRs. On average, NPR 500 was paid to the participants,
which is nearly equivalent to $5.
3.3 Results
We report a series of the questionnaire and experimental results with a focus on the
rural and urban conditions with 65 and 67 groups of 260 and 268 subjects, respectively.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics on the subjects’ socio-demographic informa-
tion and on the experimental results. For the rural cohort, 38% of the participants are
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male with an average age of 34.5 years, while the urban cohort includes 58% men with
an average age of 24.5 years. This result is attributed to the fact that many young men in
the rural areas migrate to the urban areas or even to foreign countries for employment.
With respect to education, more than 50% of the subjects in the urban areas have
a university undergraduate degree (16 years of schooling as the median in table 3.1),
while the subjects in the rural areas possess 10 years of schooling as the median value.
In regards to occupations, 90% and 6% of subjects in the rural and urban areas work
in agriculture, respectively, implying that more than 90% of the urban subjects work in
non-agricultural sectors such as the business, service and government sectors. Accord-
ingly, household income is higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Overall, the
summary statistics of socio-demographic information presented in Table 3.1 reflect the
fact that urban areas are more capitalistic, providing non-agricultural employment and
opportunities such as education. On the other hand, in the rural areas, individuals are
less educated and tend to engage in agriculture and forestry.
Table 3.1 presents the subjects’ social value orientations (hereafter, SVOs) between
the rural and urban areas where the SVO game was conducted to categorize subjects
into a prosocial or proself group. First, a significant difference in SVOs is shown in the
table, demonstrating that 76% of the subjects in the rural areas are prosocial, while only
39% of prosocial subjects are found in the urban areas. This difference affects the group
composition of members based on SVOs between the rural and urban areas. In the rural
areas, the average (median) number of prosocial members in a group is 3.03 (3), and
it is 1.57 (1) for the urban areas. As one group includes 4 subjects, this is expected to
affect how rural and urban groups harvest the resources. This SVO result shows that
individuals are less prosocial in capitalistic areas, placing more emphasis on their own
gains.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of terminal periods between rural and urban areas
With respect to the terminal periods, the important results can be found for the mea-
sures of central locations and variability between the rural and urban areas. The median
(average) terminal period is 6.00 (7.63) for the rural areas, while it is 1.00 (2.24) for the
urban areas, implying that more than 50% of groups in the urban areas exhaust the re-
source or select a red chip at an initial period and never proceed to the 2nd period. On the
other hand, most groups in the rural areas successfully continue the CPR game to more
than 6 periods, and one group even reaches 20 periods of continuation. For the group
achieving the “longest” play period, we asked the group members to stop the game due
to time and budget constraints. The standard deviation for the rural areas (= 5.56) is
much higher than that in the urban areas (= 2.19) (Table 3.1). These statistical findings
are in line with the fact that the rural groups play the game for much longer than the
urban groups.
Further, Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of individual harvests (payoffs). The
median (average) harvest is 47.50 (143.14) for the rural areas, while it is only 30 (36.23)
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Table 3.2: Terminal periods across the rural and urban areas.
Terminal periods Frequency Red chip % of red chip
Urban areas
1 43 1 2%
2 5 2 40%
3 6 2 50%
4 4 2 50%
5 3 2 67%
6 1 0 0%
7 2 0 0%
8 0 0 0%
9 2 0 0%
10 1 0 0%
Urban subtotal 67 10 15%
Rural areas
1 7 0 0%
2 2 1 50%
3 10 3 30%
4 7 0 0%
5 4 3 75%
6 6 2 33%
7 3 1 33%
8 3 2 67%
9 3 3 100%
10 3 2 67%
11 0 0 0%
12 2 2 100%
13 2 2 100%
14 0 0 0%
15 1 0 0%
16 8 0 0%
17 1 1 100%
18 0 0 0%
19 2 0 0%
20 2 0 0%
Rural subtotal 65 22 33%
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for the urban areas. This is a clear evidence that urban subjects not only fail in sustaining
the resources, but also end up having lower payoffs. Next, Table 3.1 also shows the
summary statistics of “prosocial” individual harvests (payoffs) (Total harvests (payoffs)
prosocial subjects had, and see Table 3.1 for the detailed definition). Interestingly, the
median is 53 (174.49) for the rural areas, while it is only 30 (40.36) for the urban areas.
This implies that prosocial subjects in the urban areas do not differ from general “urban”
subjects with respect to harvests, but prosocial subjects in the rural areas perform better
than general “rural” subjects.
Table 3.2 summarizes the frequency distributions of the terminal periods and of game
termination via “red chip” selection. Red-chip terminations are more common for the
rural areas than for the urban areas, with the overall percentage of red chips selected in
the rural and urban areas amounting to 33% and 15%, respectively. This is consistent
with the fact that the probability of red-chip termination increases with longer periods of
play for the rural groups. In fact, only one red chip is selected among all 43 terminations
at “terminal period 1” for the urban groups as shown in Table 3.2, implying that many
urban groups (42 urban groups) terminate the game by exhausting the resources at the
1st period. On the other hand, the rural groups could have continued the game for
much longer if there were no red-chip termination rule. Therefore, we believe that
the significant gap in terminal periods between the rural and urban areas would exist
irrespective of the red-chip termination rule.
Fig 3.2 shows the corresponding frequency distributions where the vertical axis de-
notes the frequency and the horizontal axis denotes the terminal period. The distribution
for the rural areas is broader than that for the urban areas, and the two frequency distri-
butions are different from one another. In particular, the highest spike in the frequency
distribution for the urban areas occurs in period 1, confirming that more than 50% of
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urban groups terminate the game at an initial period. For the post-questionnaires, we
include the following question: “how did you want to play?” A considerable number of
urban subjects answered to this question as follows: “I really wanted to play the game
for longer, but I was not sure whether the other group members were motivated to do
the same.” This type of answer was given by 51% of the urban subjects. It appears that
many urban subjects recognize some potential benefits of playing the game for longer.
However, they did not actually restrain their harvests for continuation even at an initial
period due to their concerns about other members. To confirm the difference in fre-
quency distributions between the rural and urban areas, we conducted a Mann-Whitney
test. The result shows that the frequency distributions differ from one another at a 1%
level of statistical significance.
We characterize resource sustainability in the dynamic CPR games by running re-
gression of the terminal periods where the rural dummy, SVO and socio-demographic
information are taken as independent variables. As the terminal periods take positive in-
tegers, a Poisson regression is employed in our analysis. The Poisson regression model
can be specified as:
Yj = β0 + β1Xj + β2Rj + β3Zj + j,
where j is a group index from 1, . . . , n, Yj is the explanatory variable (terminal periods)
for group j, Xj is a number of prosocial members in group j, Rj is a regional dummy
variable taking 1 if the region of group j is rural, otherwise 0, and Zj is a vector of
other socio-demographic independent variables that may be assumed to characterize the
terminal periods Yj . Finally, j is an error term. The parameter βi for i = 0, 1, 2 is a set
of coefficients for an intercept,Xj andRj , respectively. Theβ3 is a vector of coefficients
for other independent variables Zj . We are interested in estimating the coefficients of β1
and β2, but we cannot interpret them as they are given. The marginal effect of the number
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of prosocial members in a group can be approximated by 100 ·β1 which is interpreted as
the percentage change. The marginal effect of the regional dummy (percentage change)
is derived from a formula of exp(β2)− 1 (See, e.g., Wooldridge (Wooldridge, 2008)).
Table 3.3 reports the estimated coefficients and their respective standard errors with
statistical significance. Model 1 includes the number of prosocial members in a group
and the regional dummy as independent variables. The results reveal that both inde-
pendent variables exhibit a statistical significance of 1% and positively affect the ter-
minal periods. More specifically, the expected terminal period increases by 68% with
an increase of prosocial members in a group, holding other factors fixed. The expected
terminal period for the rural areas is interpreted to be approximately 45% higher than
that for the urban areas, holding other factors fixed. As mentioned earlier, the marginal
effect of the regional dummy variable can be approximated by the following formula:
exp(.37)−1 ≈ 0.448 ≈ 45%. These marginal effects are considered to be economically
significant, illustrating the strong effects of member prosociality and of the regional
dummy. As the regional dummy used in our analysis is considered to represent the de-
gree of capitalism, we conclude that resource sustainability tends to be compromised as
societies become more capitalistic.
For the robustness check, we run another Poisson regression by including other in-
dependent variables of individual characteristics as shown in model 2 of Table 3.3, the
average income, the number of males, the average education level and the average age
for each group in both areas. The main results of model 2 do not differ from those of
model 1. Rather, the economic significance of the estimated coefficient for the regional
dummy increases, while it almost remains the same for the number of prosocial mem-
bers in a group. The estimated coefficients for the number of prosocial members in a
group and the regional dummy are still statistically and economically significant. The
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Table 3.3: Poisson regression for the terminal periods in the dynamic CPR games
Model 1 Model 2
# of prosocial members in a group 0.68*** 0.65***
(0.041) (0.044)
Regional dummy 0.37*** 0.49***
(0.108)
Av. income in a group −0.29
(0.042)
# of males in a group 0.077**
(0.039)
Av. education in a group −0.0045
(0.021)
Av. age in a group −0.077
(0.070)
Constant −0.55*** −0.37
(0.13) (0.44)
Wald χ2 333.08*** 530.86***
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.46
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 per-
cent level and *significant at the 10 percent level.
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expected terminal period is interpreted to increase by 65% with an increase in prosocial
members in a group. Likewise, the expected terminal period for the rural areas is esti-
mated to be roughly 63% higher than that for the urban areas (The marginal effect of a
regional dummy= exp(0.49)− 1 ≈ 0.63).
It is also observed that average income, average education and average age have no
significant effects. An exception is that the number of males in a group that shows a pos-
itive effect with statistical significance of 5%. However, the magnitude is 7.70%, which
could be considered small in comparison to the regional effect and social preferences.
This result may derive from gender inequality in the society as Nepal is a highly male-
dominated society. Past literature has also revealed that women are less cooperative
with outgroup members than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). We attempted to create
alternative specifications for the Poisson regression. However, the results with respect
to the number of prosocial members in a group and the regional dummy do not change
significantly. We confirm that these two variables remain statistically and economically
significant, irrespective of the specifications used in the models. The SVO and the de-
gree of capitalism (regional dummy) are key determinants of resource sustainability.
The SVO is a good proxy for individual social preferences, and our SVO results
are intuitive in the sense that more prosocial subjects in a group lead to better resource
sustainability outcomes. On the other hand, our results for the regional dummy raise the
following question. What does the regional dummy truly capture in the regression? In
this paper, we define capitalism as the ongoing modernization of competitive societies.
Urban areas examined in the field experiment (e.g., Kathmandu) are considered to be
capitalistic societies, rapidly developing in a competitive fashion. By contrast, rural
areas such as the Chitwan district are still home to agrarian and traditional societies.
Urban areas such as Kathmandu have attracted a large number of migrants from
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other areas of Nepal. Individuals migrate to urban areas because they imagine that bet-
ter opportunities for safety, education and employment are provided in these areas. In
reality, however, urban areas in Nepal have become denser, and individuals are required
to compete with others for survival in business, service and government sectors by uti-
lizing their skills and education. In many cases, individuals do not know who their
neighbors are with their busy lives. Simply put, life in current Nepalese urban areas
does not require individuals to interact or to cooperate with neighbors and others on a
daily basis. Recall that more than half of urban subjects answered in our questionnaire
surveys “I really wanted to play the game for longer, but I was not sure whether the
other group members were motivated to do the same.” This trend represents the general
assumptions urban subjects possess about how other people behave.
In the rural areas, most individuals still engage in agriculture and in natural resource
management based on indigenous knowledge and traditional practices where cooper-
ation and sharing are quite common among individuals. For instance, Mela pat and
Parma are well known as voluntary and cooperative farming practices that prevail in ru-
ral Nepalese culture. Individuals exchange or offer farming and forestry services without
monetary rewards. Such forms of voluntary cooperation remain common of Nepalese
rural areas, as rural residents are vulnerable to natural uncertainties and calamities, and
cannot sustain their lives without mutual cooperation. We suspect that such regular
human network linkage through daily interaction in Nepal shape rural individuals’ pref-
erences, customs, norms, assumptions about others through for sustainably managing
resources.
In our dynamic CPR games, each subject in a group does not know the identity
of other group members, and cannot infer how other members behave. That is, each
subject needs to decide what to do under the poor information environment. In such
60
a case, it is claimed that people follow what they have experienced, learned and ob-
served from others in their daily life, and their behaviors shall be dominated by not only
individual preferences (SVOs) but also conformity for proper actions that people have
developed (Henrich and McElreath, 2003; Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004). In particular, it
is our belief that the individual decisions and outcomes in the 1st period of the dynamic
CPR games shall be influenced by such conformity. From the 2nd period onward, each
subject confirms and/or adapts her actions to updated conformity, following the obser-
vations in the previous periods. The conformity people possess based on their daily life
appears to be very different between urban and rural areas, reflecting a huge discrep-
ancy of 1st-period outcomes and the strong effect captured by the regional dummy in
the regression analyses.
In summary, the differences in daily practices of cooperation and competition for
survival or for earning incomes between the rural and urban areas appear to affect indi-
viduals’ preferences, customs, social norms on resource use, assumptions about others,
etc in collective CPR settings. The regional dummy is considered to capture important
factors other than the SVO. Following the previous arguments that social environments
affect individual preferences and behaviors (North, 1990; Henrich et al., 2005; Dawkins,
2006; Wilson et al., 2009; Henrich et al., 2010a; Leibbrandt et al., 2013), our field ex-
periment serves as a first attempt to demonstrate that both the SVO and other factors
captured by the degree of capitalism (regional dummy) are important for resource sus-
tainability. This analysis shows that resource sustainability will be compromised by
changes in human nature through interactions between individuals, as societies develop
in capitalistic ways. This implies that individuals may be losing their coordination abil-
ities to solve social dilemmas of resource sustainability in capitalistic societies.
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3.4 Conclusion
This experiment has analyzed resource sustainability in a dynamic setting with re-
spect to the degree of capitalism and social preferences. We find that the proportion of
prosocial individuals in the urban areas is lower than that in the rural areas, and urban
residents deplete resources more quickly than rural residents. The composition of pro-
self and prosocial individuals in a group and the degree of capitalism (rural vs. urban)
are identified as two central factors, such that an increase in prosocial members in a
group or the regional change from the urban to the rural improve resource sustainability
by approximately 65% and by 63%, respectively. Overall, this paper shows that when
societies evolve into more capitalistic environments, the sustainability of common pool
resources tends to be lost via changes in individual preferences, social norms, customs
and assumptions about others through the ways of human interactions. That is, individ-
uals may be losing their coordination abilities in managing social dilemmas of resource
sustainability in capitalistic societies.
We note some limitations of our study. This research does not fully address the de-
tails of rural-specific effects on the sustainability of common pool resources. In reality,
rural-specific effects might not only compose of the ways of human interactions or hu-
man network but in a daily life there could be other factors, such that it hold strong social
capital or conformity among them. In the future, we should collect more detailed data
about human interactions and other possible factors that may represent the differences
between rural and urban areas. If such rich data are successfully collected, new method-
ologies such as social network methods can be utilized to analyze network effects in
resource utilization. It is also very important to ensure external validity of our findings
by conducting further experiments in the future. Shahrier et al. Shahrier et al. (2016)
show that a larger proportion of prosocial people are found in rural areas than urban
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areas in Bangladesh, which is consistent with our result. We expect that the same type
of qualitative results with our CPR experiments shall be confirmed in different countries
and contexts.
Chapter 4
Generativity between rural and urban societies
in a developing country
4.1 Introduction
Generativity, concern and commitment for the current and next generations, is one
important element for sustainable development of a society, since higher generativity
of the current generation induces people to educate and benefit the next generation and
even the next (Erikson, 1963; Volckmann, 2014). Generativity is expressed through the
daily practices and human interactions such as charity, mentoring, nursing, volunteering,
teaching, religious movement and political activities for the next generation (McAdams
and de St. Aubin, 1992). In reality, societies transition over time with “overlapping
generations” in the sense that some members in one generation survive and remain as
members in the next generations (Gaspar and Lauren, 2013). Unfortunately, it is claimed
that the current generation has behaved in more selfish ways than ever, compromising
generativity and intergenerational sustainability by incurring costs for the current and
next generation, i.e., “generativity crisis” (Sasaki, 2004; Fisher et al., 2004; Milinski
et al., 2006; Pratt et al., 2013; Molnar and Vass, 2013; Jia et al., 2015; Lefebvre and
Lefebvre, 2016). Thus, future generations thinking or generativity becomes an urgent
issue when societies are changing in favor of the current generations. Given this state of
affairs, this paper addresses the generativity in relation to intergenerational sustainability
in rural and urban areas in developing countries.1
1We have taken the context of one country, Nepal, because it is a good proxy for rep-
resenting ongoing phenomena of rapid urbanization and diminishing social connectivity
in a developing world.
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One of the most important issues faced today is to what extent the interest of future
generation need to be addressed, while a sustainable society have to satisfy current gen-
eration needs without jeopardizing the prospect of future generations (Howard, 2000;
Masini, 2013; Tonn, 2009, 2017). In fact, much of the literature in the past have con-
sidered these issues philosophically to provide institutional proposals and theoretical
framework (Inayatullah, 1997; Pino, 2007; Balazs and Gaspar, 2010; Chen et al., 2016;
Tonn, 2017; Seo, 2017). The strongest predictors for measuring people’s concern for
others is individual social preference (Van Lange et al., 2007b, 2011; Sutterlin et al.,
2013; Hauser et al., 2014; Timilsina et al., 2017). However, there have been no stud-
ies that established relationship between individual social preference and generativity.
Therefore, the key question is how generativity is affected when a society is changing
quickly.
Generativity has been studied by many researchers, and the generative behavior
checklist (GBC) is established to be one of the most reliable and internally consistent
measures (McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams et al., 1993; McAdams and
de St. Aubin, 1995). Most studies have sought to characterize the GBC as parts of
innate human psychology, focusing on parenting, degree of well-being, life satisfaction
and societal concerns (Peterson and Stewart, 1993; Morfei et al., 2004; Huta and Zuroff,
2007; Newton et al., 2014). In particular, Hart et al. (2001) have empirically charac-
terized generativity and found that it has a positive association with social involvement
related to parenting in both white and black Americans. Similarly, Hofer et al. (2008)
have confirmed that the psychological mechanisms of the generativity model are consis-
tently applicable even in a cross-country comparison. In conclusion, these studies have
demonstrated that the GBC can explain behaviors and preferences of social involvement
in relation to people’s innate psychology, concerns and actual social behaviors.
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Economists and behavioral scientists have considered that the socioeconomic en-
vironment influences people’s social preferences and actual behaviors (Henrich et al.,
2005, 2010b; Van Lange et al., 2007b; Leibbrandt et al., 2013). Schotter and Sopher
(2003) and Hauser et al. (2014) have shown that the current generation can neither make
sustainable decisions in an intergenerational setting, nor take the balance of costs and
benefits for future generation when facing excessive competitive economic environment.
Henrich et al. (2005, 2010b) and Leibbrandt et al. (2013) have demonstrated that peo-
ple’s social behaviors and preferences are affected by the degree of market integration in
societies and workplace environment, respectively. Similarly, Ockenfels and Weimann
(1999) and Brosig-Koch et al. (2011) have analyzed people’s cooperative and solidar-
ity behaviors in the eastern and western Germany, demonstrating that subjects from the
eastern part act more selfishly than those from the western parts. They conclude that so-
cial histories and socioeconomic environment play important roles in shaping people’s
social preferences and behaviors. In summary, the psychologists have addressed how
generativity is associated with people’s innate psychology and actual behaviors, while
the economists and behavioral scientists find how social preference and behaviors are
affected by economic environment.
Cultures gradually propagate through various ways such as success-bias transmis-
sion in societies and even affect human preferences and behaviors (Henrich et al., 2005;
Dawkins, 2006; Richardson and Boyd, 2008; Wilson et al., 2009). Likewise, genera-
tivity is hypothesized to be affected by cultures, as it is manifested through both proso-
cial and proself behaviors originating from people’s social preferences (Kotre, 1984;
McAdams, 1985). Since societies are becoming more competitive and modernized in
the globalized market economy under capitalism, it is expected that such changes in
societies as part of cultures affect not only preferences but also generativity. However,
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no previous researches address how generativity is evolving with economic develop-
ment of societies and a change in preferences. In this research, we consider ongoing
modernization of competitive societies as part of culture and address how generativity
changes with such modernization and social preferences. To this end, we conduct field
experiments of the social value orientation (SVO) and the generative behavior checklist
(GBC) in the two fields of Nepalese societies: (1) urban and (2) rural areas.
4.2 Methods and materials
We implemented field experiments and questionnaire surveys in the rural and urban
areas, and employed different approaches of random sampling, because they possess
distinct economic and socio-demographic characteristics. Kathmandu and Pokhara are
chosen as urban areas that are the first and second largest urban societies in Nepal (fig-
ure 4.1). In the urban areas, we administered field experiments and surveys with 268
subjects. These cities are highly populated where most people engage in business, ser-
vice and government sectors. To maintain random sampling of subjects, a occupation-
based randomization procedure was taken. First, we identify a proportion of each oc-
cupational category in total population of the urban areas by referring to governmental
and international non-governmental reports such as Central Bureau of Statistics (2011)
and UNDP (2014). After that, we randomly select a number of organizations or com-
panies for each category. Based on their compliance, we select individuals from these
organizations in the way that subjects do not know one another in the same session. Our
field experiments and surveys have been carried out in the city and community halls of
the urban areas.
In the rural areas, we conducted field experiments and surveys with 260 subjects.
Chitwan and Prabat are chosen as rural areas (figure 4.1). These districts consist of
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Figure 4.1: The Map of Nepal
many small villages and are known as the least populated areas where most people en-
gage in agriculture and forestry for their livelihood. In rural areas, we conducted a
household-level randomization procedure. First, we designate the number of samples
for the selected villages based on the total number of households provided by each vil-
lage development committee office. After that, we select the household number and
randomly invite one household by sending them invitation letters. Our monetary in-
centives and the conditions in invitation letters enabled to collect an enough number of
subjects. The field experiments and surveys were conducted in the schools of the rural
areas.
The SVO of the “slider method” has been conducted to identify subjects’ social pref-
erences as prosocial or proself in urban and rural areas (Murphy et al., 2011). Figure 4.2
shows six items of the slider measure that gives numbers to represent outcomes for one-
self and the other in a pair of two persons where the other is unknown to the subject.
Subjects are asked to make a choice among the nine options for each item. Each subject
chooses her allocation by marking a line at the point that defines her most preferred
68
distribution between oneself and the other. The mean allocation for oneself As and the
mean allocation for the other Ao are computed from all six items (see figure 4.2). Then,
50 is subtracted from As, and Ao to shift the base of the resulting angle to the center
of the circle (50, 50). The index of a subject’s SVO is given by SVO = arctan (Ao)−50
(As)−50 .
Depending on the values generated from the test, social preferences are categorized as
follows: 1. altruist: SVO > 57.15◦, 2. prosocial: 22.45◦ < SVO < 57.15◦, 3. individu-
alist: −12.04◦ < SVO < 22.45◦ and 4. competitive types: SVO < −12.04◦.
The SVO framework assumes that people have different motivations and goals for
evaluating resource allocations between oneself and others. Also, the SVOs or social
preferences are established to be stable for a long time (see, e.g., Van Lange et al.,
2007b; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011). Responses that are yielded from six primary items
give complete categories of social preferences. A major reason for using six primary
slider measures by Murphy et al. (2011) is due to its simplicity and easy to implement in
the fields of Nepal. It is very intuitive for participants to understand even with a limited
level of education. As is done in psychology research, we further simplify the four cate-
gories of social preferences into two categories of prosocial and proself types; “altruist”
and “prosocial” types are categorized as prosocial subjects, while “individualistic” and
“competitive” types are categorized as “proself” subjects (see Murphy et al., 2011).
The GBC developed by McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) checks the frequencies
of generative behaviors each individual has taken in the past. Specifically, the GBC asks
how many times a person has performed for 50 different behaviors, among which the
only 40 behaviors are suggestive of “generativity.”2 The examples are “taught somebody
a skill,” “read a story to a child,” “served as a role model for a young person” and
2GBC is good proxy of behavioral expression for real behaviour and it is also easy
for people to answer even in remote rural areas of Nepal. The remaining 10 behaviors
in the GBC questionnaire that are not counted for generativity are “fillers.”
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Figure 4.2: Social value orientation measure by the slider method
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In this task you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to as the other. This other person is someone you 
do not know and will remain mutually anonymous. All of your choices are completely confidential. You will be making a series of 
decisions about allocating resources between you and this other person. For each of the following questions, please indicate the 
distribution you prefer most by marking the respective position along the midline.  You can only make one mark for each question.
Your decisions will yield money for both yourself and the other person. In the example below, a person has chosen to distribute money 
so that he/she receives 50 dollars, while the anonymous other person receives 40 dollars.
There are no right or wrong answers, this is all about personal preferences.  After you have made your decision, write the resulting 
distribution of money on the spaces on the right. As you can see, your choices will influence both the amount of money you receive 
as well as the amount of money the other receives. 
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“made something for somebody and then gave it to them.” Subjects need to write “0”
if they have not performed a specific generative behavior, “1” if they have performed
the behavior once and “2” if they have performed the behavior more than once for the
last one year. Scores on the 40 generative behaviors were summed for each subject to
compute a total generativity score.
Considering the opportunity costs of time and to attract subjects to the experimental
sites, motivate them seriously to participate in the surveys and games, we have imple-
mented the questionnaire surveys and the SVO game with monetary payments. In each
session, we have collected 20 to 40 subjects in a site, provide experimental instructions
to subjects, and the experimenter (the first author) orally made presentations to confirm
subjects’ understanding. We also used six research assistants and helped subjects. Af-
ter eliciting subjects’ SVOs, we conducted questionnaire surveys to collect individual
socio-demographic information.
Subjects are paid on the basis of their earnings from the SVO game. After each
subject has made his/her decisions, they write the resulting distribution of money on
the spaces provided on the right-hand side as shown in figure 4.2. The total amount of
points subject allocated for oneself and for the other are calculated from all six items
as shown in figure 4.2. Depending on the points generated from the game, the points
are converted into real money with an experimental exchange rate. In our experiment,
we use 10 points equivalent to 1 NPR. At the end, we randomly matched one subject
with another to make pairs for calculating the total payoff of each subject and make
payments. One session took 40 to 60 minutes, and the average payment was NPR 200
(approximately USD 2.10) with a show-up fee of NPR 100 (USD 1.05).
This study finally analyzes the association of generativity with people’s social pref-
erences and the locations of two different areas. A dummy variable for controlling the
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urban and rural areas in the analysis is intended to represent different degree of modern-
ization (equivalently, the degree of capitalism) in societies. To characterize which social
preference and society lead to higher levels of generativity, nonparametric statistical and
regression analyses are employed. The Mann-Whitney test is used to identify the distri-
butional difference of generativity across the two areas and their social preferences. The
regression model estimates the marginal impact on generativity when a key predictor,
such as SVOs and an area dummy, increases, holding other factors fixed. The set of
independent variables includes SVOs, area dummy, household income, age, education,
gender and employment.3 Table 3.1 summarizes the definition of the variables in the
analysis.
4.3 Results
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the statistics of subjects’ socio-demographic informa-
tion and generativity, respectively. Table 4.1 shows that 38% of the subjects are male in
the rural, while 58% of the subjects are male in the urban. With respect to education,
more than 50% of subjects in the urban have an undergraduate degree in universities
(16 years of schooling as the median in table 3.1). On the other hand, subjects in the
rural possess 10 years of schooling as the median. Regarding occupation, 90% and 6%
of subjects in the rural and the urban engage in agriculture, respectively. It implies that
the urban areas in our field do not depend on agriculture anymore, but rural areas are
still agriculture-based societies. Reflecting this difference of dependency on agriculture,
3Individual social preferences are established to remain the same for a long time (Van
Lange et al., 2007b; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011), while the GBC is a behavior checklist
for the actions that subjects have taken over the last one year. Therefore, taking SVOs as
an independent variable in the regression of generativity does not cause any erogeneity
problem or reverse causality.
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household income is higher in the urban than in the rural (table 4.1). Overall, the sum-
mary statistics of socio-demographic information in table 4.1 are in line with our initial
expectations that urban societies are more advanced and modernized (or urbanized) in
many aspects. On the other hand, in the rural areas, people mainly engage in agriculture
and forestry.
Table 3.1 shows subjects’ SVOs to be prosocial or proself between the rural and the
urban. The major difference can be seen in the “SVO” variable, exhibiting that 76%
of subjects in the rural are prosocial, while only 39% of subjects are prosocial in the
urban. Specifically, 197 out of 260 rural subjects are prosocial in the rural, while 105
out of 263 urban subjects are prosocial in the urban (table 4.2). The chi-square test for
independence between subjects prosociality and area rejects the null hypothesis at 1%
level of significance (p = 0.000), it implies that prosociality among people is different
between the rural and urban areas, and prosocial (proself) people are dominant in the
rural (urban) areas. This SVO result appears to suggest that people tend to be more
proself as societies are more modernized and developed.
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of subjects’ generativity. Interestingly,
mean and median of generativity are different between rural and urban areas. The me-
dian (mean) of generativity in the rural is 42.00 (42.05), while that in the urban is 38.00
(37.91). It implies that the both the mean and median of generativity in the rural are
higher than those in the urban. We further categorize subjects generativity by SVOs in
each area, for instance, the median generativity of prosocial subjects in the rural is 43.00
(the mean is 43.05) which is higher than that in the urban i.e., 41.00 and (40.23). The
median (mean) generativity for proself people in the rural is 34.00 (37.41), while that
for subjects in the urban is 37.00 (36.41). Put simply, prosocials in the rural, prosocials
in the urban, proselves in the urban and proselves in the rural are the descending orders
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Table 4.2: Generativity across regions and prosociality
N Mean Median SD1 Min Max
Urban 268 37.91 38.00 13.34 2.00 72.00
Prosocial 105 40.23 41.00 13.35 6.00 72.00
Proself 163 36.41 37.00 13.17 2.00 67.00
Rural 260 42.05 42.00 12.63 5.00 72.00
Prosocial 197 43.53 43.00 12.32 8.00 72.00
Proself 63 37.41 34.00 12.57 5.00 65.00
Prosocial 302 42.39 42.00 12.76 8.00 72.00
Proself 226 36.69 37.00 12.99 2.00 67.00
Overall 528 39.95 40.00 13.15 2.00 72.00
1 The “SD” stands for standard deviation.
of groups with respect to the central tendencies of generativity. These tendencies can
be confirmed from figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) from the associated box plots, demonstrat-
ing that the medians of generativity scores are different between urban and rural areas
as well as across people’s social preferences (prosocial and proself) in these two areas.
Overall, table 4.2, figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) suggest that prosociality and the urban vs.
the rural areas are the keys to characterize generativity.
To check whether the distributions of generativity differ from one another by areas
and SVOs, we run a Mann-Whitney tests. The null hypothesis is that the generativity
distributions are the same across two areas and SVOs (See figures 4.4(a) to 4.4(c) for
the frequency distributions of generativity). We have confirmed that all of the following
pairs reject the null hypothesis: (1) the rural vs. the urban (z = 3.404) test statistic, (2)
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Figure 4.3: Boxplot of generativity across urban and rural areas along with people’s
social preferences
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the prosocial vs. the proself (z = 4.890), (3) the prosocial in the rural vs. the proself
in the rural (z = 3.322), (4) the prosocial in the urban vs. the proself in the urban (z =
2.300), (5) the prosocial in the urban vs. the proself in the rural (z = 4.978) and (6) the
prosocial in the rural vs. the prosocial in the urban (z = 1.896). These results of Mann-
Whitney tests statistically confirm that generativity may be affected by prosociality and
areas between the rural and urban. Given the statistical significance of the generativ-
ity across areas and SVOs, we further characterize generativity by running regression
model, taking the generativity as a dependent variable and the area dummy between
the rural and the urban, SVOs and other socio-demographic information as independent
variables.4
Table 4.3 reports the estimated coefficients and their respective standard errors with
statistical significance in the regression of generativity. Model 1 in table 4.3 contains
SVOs and the area dummy of the rural as independent variables. The result reveals that
both variables exhibit statistical significance of 5% and 1%, respectively, and positively
affect the generativity. To further confirm the robustness of our result, we add socio-
demographic variables such as gender, education, age, employment, number of house-
hold members, income level in model 2 of table 4.3. We find that the SVOs and the area
dummy remains statistically significant with the same sign and magnitude, and educa-
tion is statistically significant to positively influence generativity at 5% level. However,
the magnitude of education is rather small compared with that of the SVOs and area
dummy. There are no significant associations of gender, employment, income and age
in model 2.
In model 3 with adding age squared, both age and its squared variables are signif-
icant with positive and negative signs at 10% level, respectively. This result implies
4These results of Mann-Whitney tests are statistically significant at 1% and 5%
level.
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of generativity across urban and rural areas along with people’s
social preferences
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Table 4.3: Regression analysis of generativity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 36.026*** 33.378*** 31.730***
(0.937) (3.061) (3.207)
SVOs1 (Prosocial = 1 & Proself = 0) 4.810*** 4.889*** 4.773***
(1.226) (1.227) (1.232)
Area dummy2 (Rural = 1 & Urban = 0) 2.383** 3.294** 3.129**
(1.208) (1.415) (1.410)
Gender −1.845 −1.445
(1.164) (1.182)
Education 0.419** 0.391**
(0.171) (0.171)
Employment 0.414 −0.380
(1.641) (1.662)
No of household members −0.387 −0.282
(0.598) (0.592)
Income −0.343 −0.270
(0.272) (0.274)
Age −0.039 2.718*
(0.556) (1.586)
Age squared −0.630*
(0.328)
Observations 528 528 528
R2 0.053 0.071 0.077
1 The SVO represents a dummy variable of individual social value orientations that takes
1 when the individual is prosocial. Otherwise zero.
2 The area dummy takes 1 when the subject resides in the rural area, otherwise, 0.
The variables other than the SVO and area dummy follow the descriptions in table 3.1.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level and *signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level.
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that generativity reaches its peak in midlife and starts to decline with old age. This
is consistent with McAdams et al. (1993); Newton et al. (2014) and Schoklitsch and
Baumann (2012) demonstrating that this single-peaked nature in generativity is due to
health or physical weakness. Considering the consistent results across models 1, 2 and
3, it appears that SVOs and the area dummy are strong predictors for generativity. More
specifically, in model 3, the generativity increases by 4.77 with a change in SVOs from
being in the proself to being in the prosocial, and the generativity increases by 3.13 if
the individual resides in the rural as compared with residing in the urban. Education is
statistically significant in model 3, however, the magnitude remains small.
In summary, our results find that there are more prosocial people in the rural areas;
prosocial and rural people possess higher generativity. This suggests that as societies
become more modernized and competitive in a capitalistic way, people tend to be less
concerned about others and even future generations. The strongest predictors for sus-
tainability is individual social preference (Van Lange et al., 2007a,b, 2011; Hauser et al.,
2014). In reality, generativity is expressed through the daily practices and human inter-
actions such as charity, mentoring, nursing, volunteering, teaching, religious movement
and political activities that guide current and the next generation (McAdams and de St.
Aubin, 1992). It appears that there are two channels to affect generativity. One chan-
nel is a direct effect of modernization on generativity which comes from the difference
between the rural and the urban areas. The second channel is an indirect effect of mod-
ernization on generativity, that is, modernization of societies induces people to be more
proself, and generativity decreases through such a change in social preference. Since
the magnitudes of the impacts from both SVOs and area dummy are higher, generativity
crisis in urban areas may be well explained by these two factors.
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4.4 Discussion
There are differences between urban and rural areas in many aspects such as envi-
ronment, customs technologies, physical space and architectures that influence social
interactions among people. Urban areas are high in population density and on a daily
basis people come across numerous strangers and colleagues, however, in many cases
their social-tie may be weak and there is less intimacy among themselves to act in con-
cert (Timilsina et al., 2017; Shahrier et al., 2016). To make matters worse, they may get
even suspicious at strangers and compete with colleagues. These phenomena are not so
different from basic city life in Katmandu.
On the contrary, rural areas are nature-dependent and develop on the basis of natu-
ral vegetation and fauna available, people mostly live in agriculture-based lifestyle. In
rural societies, both cultural learning and vocational training also come from families,
relatives, and neighbors because they live in agriculture-based life and the transfer of
skills and knowledge is made through close interactions in the local human network. In
such a situation, young people mimic and learn standard behaviors and belief from local
communities, in particular from older people in previous generations. Such transmis-
sion can also be considered conformist biases that they accumulate from their previous
generations and neighbors (See, e.g., Henrich and McElreath, 2003; Sasaki, 2004).
We conjecture that such human network of intergenerational linkage and interactions
in rural areas corresponds to a rural-specific effect on generativity. It appears that rural
life in Nepal induces people to interact with neighbors and others on a daily basis, while
urban life does not. Urban settlements have advanced civic amenities, opportunities
for education, facilities for transport, and businesses. These standards of living do not
induce people to be interdependent or even interact with neighbors. In terms of employ-
ment, there is always a division of labor and job specialization with many employment
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opportunities that lead to higher occupational mobility. With these realities, it is our be-
lief that the difference of how people interact with others affects social preferences and
behaviors, leading to a change in generativity with modernization (Huddart-Kennedy
et al., 2009; Timilsina et al., 2017; Shahrier et al., 2016, 2017).
Urban areas are different in terms of their functionality and classified according to
land use and density of population, but this can vary from developed countries to de-
veloping countries (McDonnell and MacGregor-Fors, 2016). Asia and Africa are go-
ing to have the world’s largest and fastest growing cities in the future and the most of
these growths will occur in emerging and developing countries (Wigginton et al., 2016).
Such a growth might help to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but
leave behind huge social and economic cost to the future generations (Henderson et al.,
2016). There are several social, behavioral and economic challenges that need to be
overcome for improving urban settlements and achieve future sustainability. An indi-
vidual’s lifestyle and decisions on how they live their life directly affects society, such
as whether to unplug cell phone or use public transport to work, or to install solar panel
on a roof for energy is highly depended upon people’s concern for others or in other
words individual social preference (Van Lange et al., 2007a, 2011).
This study shows one of the adverse consequences of unprecedented urbanization on
generativity and prosociality. Many cities that are growing in emerging and developing
countries are now in a critical pathway of change. Our results suggest that we should pri-
oritize and create a policy that can redefine economic, social and psychological aspects
of individuals towards sustainable societies. Otherwise, such unprecedented moderniza-
tion shall simply compromise pro-sustainability through a decrease in generativity and
prosociality of individuals.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper has explored how generativity is changing along with social preference
and the degree of capitalism in the society. To this end, we implemented a social value
orientation (SVO) experiment and surveys of generative checklist questionnaires in two
fields of Nepal: (i) urban and (ii) rural areas. The results show that mainly individual
generativity might have been positively affected by two channels, i.e, prosociality, and
rural-specific effect. Since we have found a higher proportion of prosocial people in ru-
ral areas than in urban areas, we proposed that as societies are getting more modernized
and developed in a capitalistic way, generativity shall be further compromised through
changes in social preference and economic environments.
Our research shows the evidence that economic environments affect people’s pref-
erences and even behaviors that are important for intergenerational sustainability. We
conjecture that the difference of daily life between rural and urban areas influences how
people interact with others including families, relatives, neighbors, and strangers. Rural
areas might have induced people to interact with others and we consider such inter-
actions could be the main factor for higher generativity. On the other hand, in urban
areas, social network and the degree of interactions may be weak, although more people
happen to meet or come across one another. We believe that such difference of human
interactions or network between urban and rural areas is a key to explain generativity.
Greater attention seems to be required particularly in urban areas to induce people
to have a more generative expression in their daily life through institutional change or
some social device. We need to develop an extended public conversation about the
responsibilities of the current generation to the future in urban areas. The educational
institution should play vital role to focus more on intergenerational linkage through its
teaching pedagogy and curriculums. The problem of generativity does not only revolve
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in the sphere of one family or parent-child relation but it covers a wider aspects of
society. Thus, further emphasis should be given on how intergenerational sensibility
can be strengthen in a society as moving forward.
Finally, we note some limitation of our study. The study of generativity can be highly
abstract and this research does not fully address the details of rural-specific effects. In
reality, rural-specific effects may be decomposed in not only the ways of human interac-
tions in daily life but also other factors, further data collection and analysis is required
to compare among the youth by focusing on current young generation. In the future, we
should collect more detailed data of human interactions, intergenerational transfer, atti-
tudes of rural and urban youth toward previous generation or elderly and other possible
factors that may represent the differences between rural and urban areas. If such rich
data are successfully collected, new methodologies such as social network methods can
be utilized (Kim et al., 2015). We did not conduct such analysis and data collection be-
cause the main purpose of this research is to establish the relation between generativity
and modernization of societies as a first priority. These caveats notwithstanding, it is
our belief that this research is considered an important step when societies are changing
to be more modernized and intergenerational sustainability is claimed to be a pressing
issue.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Firstly, results from the experiment based on market-based instrument, marketable
permit system (MPS) show that it can be a possible solution in developing countries for
managing natural resources. However, one should be cautious as numerous important
questions are still left open for e.g., regulatory environment, distribution of forestland,
quality of timber and location. Many such technical issues need to be analyzed. Despite
such technical issues and other uncertainties, we have shown an experimental evidence
on how introducing the market-based mechanism could be the good fit for natural re-
source management when the externalities from the market can be minimized. It is our
belief that the scope of the marketable permit system (MPS) has been broadened with
the implications of our experiments regarding the resource-use exclusion of forestland
resources, and this research counters the myth that market-based instruments work only
for industrialized nations. In fact, the MPS would work well in developing countries and
this field experiment can be considered as an important step toward applying the MPS
to various resource problems in both developed and developing nations.
Second, during economic transition in a country when the market becomes very
much competitive activities that are morally and ethically objectionable such as child
labor, corruption, higher executive pay, commercialization of education, and earning
manipulation likely to happen (Shleifer, 2004). In other words, we can say in such situ-
ation people might lose the ability to cooperate and the majority might want to freeride.
Therefore, in our second study, we conduct an economic experiment of dynamic com-
mon pool resource to characterize modern cities of developing world to confirm if they
have abilities to perform collective action successfully in a sustainable way. Cities are
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going to grow in Asia and Africa in the future and rural locals are considered to be
successful in efficiently managing village-level natural resources, however, the ques-
tion remains, if modern cities can maintain sustainability. Therefore, through a field
experiment on commons, we have shown that there is disintegration among people with
ongoing modernization in the society. Market erase sociality and it induces people to
express with more relativity. People could not manage commons in highly advanced and
modernized societies, peoples’ daily practice and social learning play an important role
in people’s action in a society. It is our belief that this field experiment is an important
first step to characterize resource sustainability in relation to the degree of capitalism
and social preference.
Third, we have shown one of the adverse consequences of unprecedented urban-
ization on generativity and prosociality. Many cities that are growing in emerging and
developing countries are now in a critical pathway of change. It has been clear that eco-
nomic environments affect people’s preferences and even behaviors that are important
for intergenerational sustainability. Therefore, our hypothesis that due to the difference
of daily life between rural and urban areas, it affects people’s interaction with others in-
cluding families, relatives, neighbors, and strangers. Rural areas are considered to have
higher interaction with others and considered to have higher generativity and concern
for others. On the other hand, in urban areas, social network and the degree of interac-
tions may be weak, although more people happen to meet or come across each other.
Urban people are not induced by city life to be dependent on other or to have higher
sociability, due to which, there are differences in human interactions between urban and
rural that highly affects generativity.
These work clearly suggests us that new institutions or devices are necessary in place
to manage CPRs in a sustainable way or to maintain future sustainability.
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